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3y 
Nicola Swainson 
ABSTRACT 
This paper is concerned to evaluate the nature of industrial growth 
in Kenya in the context of worldrfwide concentration of capital after the 
Second -forId War. There is a focus on the role of the metropolitan state in 
the promotion of colonial 'development*. This change of-emphasis in raising 
productivity in the industrial as well as agricultural spheres in British 
colonial territories after the war was, in part, £ consequence of Britain's 
radically altered world poitiono The result of this change in metropolitan 
policy was the provision of large grants for the colonial territories on a 
scale unprecedented before 1939» which were to be utilised in providing infra-
structure and facilities to encourage the flow of private capital. In this 
process, the role of finance capital is enhanced to provide favourable conditions 
for the ultimate intervention of foreign industrial capital. The case studies 
examine in detail the activist role of the post-war colonial state in supporting 
the participation of industrial capital in colonial enterprises. 
Due to the length of this paper I have decided to discuss one case 
study only in order to have a focul.point for the seminar. This will involve 
an analysis of the role of the st^ te, in building up Kenya's pineapple industry, 
see.pp* 66—7& of the above paper* 
THE ROLE OF .THE STATE IN KENYA'S POST WAR INDUSTRIALISATION: 
The aim in this part is to examine the underlying basis for the 
change ip official British policy towards the colonies s which was to instigate 
the development of an industrial sector in Kenya after 1845. The changing 
needs of British industrial capital after the war are also examined from a 
historical perspective. There follows an examination of regulations and 
incentives affecting industrialisation in Kenya Colony and also the role of 
state finance capital in supporting the interventions of industrial capital. 
The CDC and East African Industries are taken as an example of the latter. 
After an assessment of the extent and types of local manufacturing concerns 
developed by both local and foreign capitals two case studies, one on cement 
and the other on the pineaj^ Le industry, illustrate the initial relationship 
between the state and private capital. Then they, develop through the 1960*s 
to show consolidation of these industries under the control of two monopoly 
producers of those commodities on a world wide scale. 
Before analysing the emphasis of British colonial policy towards 
the colonial territories in the post-war era, it is necessary from the outset 
to qualify what we understand by the 'state' in a period of monopoly capitalism 
after the Second World War. There will be a tendency throughout to oversimplify 
the relationship between the 'state' and 'capital', although it must be 
stressed that the interests of the two are by no means to be taken as synoiiymous. 
It is Indicated that after the war British industrial capitals needed to expand 
production areas into the colonies in order to enhance their competitive position 
by producing behind tariff walls. At a certain level the British colonial state, 
concerned from a 'bureaucratic' point of view with substantial dollar deficits, 
supported this move of industrial capital into colonial production, as the 
British state wished to enhance the flow of raw materials to the metropolis from 
the sterling areas and to develop industries in the colonies that would decrease 
dependence on products from the dollar areas. 
However some reservations are- required when dealing with the concept 
"of the.'state' in colonial development, and its relationship with capitals,! 
have found that the redefinition of the Marxist.theory of the state in advanced 
capitalist societies as put forward by Poulantzas is useful for this purpose."'" 
The state apparatus or 'bureaucracy' in a general sense constitutes a specific 
social category. This bureaucracy is clearly drawn from different social origins, 
and they therefore do not represent one class, but derive their unity rather from 
1. N. Poulantzas, ''The. Problem of the Capitalist State'', in the New Left 
Review, (December, 1969), pgs. 73-77. This arguement is further developed by him 
in N. Poulantzas, "Classes in Contemporary Capitalism", (New Left Books, 1974.) 
the fact that they have as their objective function the actualisation of the 
role of the state. This means that the bureaucracy as a unified social 
category in this context acts as a servant of the ruling class. The totality 
2 of this role itself co-incides with the interests of the ruling class. This 
must be taken as a starting point in any comprehension of the 'role of the 
the 
state' in development of the colonial territories. However, the substantial 
modifications in the state apparatus in Britain after the war were in them-
selves due to changes in the relations of production and the development of 
the class struggle within the metropolis. 
A. BRITISH COLONIAL POLICY 
The structure of the dependent British Empire rested on a series of 
negotiated constitutional arrangements which each colonial territory had made 
with the mother country. The powers of the Secretary of 'State for the Colonies 
were limited by the particular circumstances in which each territory had been 
acquired. It is important to note that particularly before the Second World 
War, each territorial administration manned by the Colonial Servive retained 
a high degree of initiative. One example of this state of affairs in Kenya 
Colony was the persistant refusal of the settler class to sanction through the 
legislative committee (LEGCO) the metropolitan administration's proposals for 
the introduction of an Income Tax law that would ~pply largely to the European 
community. (This group rejected two attempts to get this measure through LEGCO, 
3 in 1922 and 1930 and it was finally passed in 1936). 
The Colonial regulationss therefore, had never prescribed a uniform 
pattern of administrative relationships which would have given the colonial 
Office direct control over development projects. It is significant that in the 
pre-war period the directives from the Colonial Office concerning the restriction 
of industries which might compete with British manufactured goods at heme and 
in colonial markets were more strongly opposed than in many of the other colonial 
terrirories.4 
2. Ibid:, NLR article, Pg. 73. 
3. For further details see, N. Swainscn, "Company Formation in Kenya with 
Particular Reference to the Role of Foreign Capital'1, in R. Kaplinsky (Ed), "Readings 
on the Multinational.Corporation in Kenya", OUF (forthcoming)., also IDS/WP form, P. 10. 
During the 1930's the Tanganyikan sisal twine industry which UK had been 
exporting to metropolitan markets, was put under pressure by the Sisal Twine Manu-
facturers Federation operating through the Colonial Office. A prohibitive tariff 
was imposed at the British end,., and the Tanganyikan company was forced in addition 
«to raise its prices, and as the firm based its success largely on its exports to 
British markets, the plant collapsed by 1938. It is significant, however that the 
sisal twine industry in Kenya which was controlled largely, by settiers -survived, due, 
to their political strength in.the Kenyan state. Although it was not airaed at 
• • } v . . . cont./p3 
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The emphasis of British colonial policy towards the colonies in the i 
inter~war period was on the extraction of raw materials to supply British 
industries. In eieeordance with the needs of British industrial capital, a ---~ 
large number, of Conservative M.P.rs had supported the establishment of the 
Empire industries Association in 1924, which was organised to campaign for a 
policy of Imperial Preference and called for loans and grants from the Treasury 
5 
to extend the system of railways in East and Central Africa. Thus, in Kenya 
before the Second World War, the small amount of assistance given to the colony 
went into infrastructural development, to facilitate the extraction of raw 
materials from thai area. It has been shown elsewhere that the metropolitan state f before the war, in response to established British industrial interests would 
ensure that any colonial industries that developed an export market to Britain 
. • i 
would be eliminated. Therefore, 'Empire Development' as propounded by Milner and 
Amery at the Colohial Office in the 1920's consisted of the encouragement of raw 
materials production which would service British industry. Their chief instrument 
was the Empire Marketing Board, founded in 1926 to advertise the marketing of I 
Empire produce, j This Board continued in business until after the Ottowa Conference 
of 1932 which established a system of Imperi&l Preference for colonial raw materials 
to Britain. The publications of this organisation continued to stress the 
importance of trading relationships, '...everything in these distant colonies turns 
on the habits and needs of the great industrial countries first and foremost, our 
6 own'. < 
! X I -JA 
There had always been a dichotomy between the official British policy 
towards Kenya.Colony and that actually implemented by! a local administration under 
1 7 pressure from settler 'clients^ord Lugard's philosophy of 'indirect rule' 
which laid stress on the doctripe of 'Native Paramountcy', and stressed the 
\ s i 'organic growth of native peoples'dominated official British policy towards \ q i l , the colonies in the 1920's. This philosophy, of course was contrary to that 
implemented by the local administration in Kenya Colony, which implemented a policy 
of coercion against the African population, in order to curtail indigenous 
capitalism and to provide a scuijce of labour power for the settler estates. Thus, 
during the inter-war period the relationship between the local administration 
in Kenya Colony and the British colonial administration had been generally con-
flictual. \ • 
[cont. from p.2 
exporting but rather to provide for"the local market, it could have developed a 
potential later on. On the other hand the textile industry was stif led in. Kenya 
until after the war due to the fact that"'the proposed investors represented Asian.-... 
capital, and so the UK textile manufacturers were able to again force the colonial " 
office to suppress the establishment ;'of any textile plants in Kenya colony which 
would-compete with their own products in that market, and potentially in the British 
market as well. 
5. J;:M.Lee,"Colonial Development and Good Govt.", (Clarendon Press, Oxford, 
1967), p.m. ^ 
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- The first Colonial Development Act of 1929 was designed by the 
metropolis to provide funds which would service the interest on loans raised 
by the colonial governments giving contracts to British firms. However, the 
onset of economic depression in the Western World in the late 1920's, prevented 
most colonial government, including Kenya, from raising sufficient loans. Indeed, 
it was the conditions of economic depression which iaid the basis for a change 
in British policy towards the Empire. The curtailment of capital projects and the 
policy of retrenchment in the 1930's marked the beginning of planned directives 
from the metropolis. More important, however, from the point of view of British 
industrial firms, was the fact that by the outbreak of the war in 1939, Britain^ r,,•re-
markets in the Colonies for manufactured goods were suffering severe competition 
from Japanese goods in particular. Colonial officers were complaining that British 
firms did not seem to be competitive in producing 'appropriate' manufactured goods 
for the Colonial markets. Thus the stage was set even before the Second World War 
for a substantial change in the practice of central colonial policy towards 
development, as well as in the strategy of industrial firms wishing to retain 
markets. 
The actual administrative practice of a central policy for colonial 
development was gained by the experience of the Second'World War. The prime 
.object of Colonial Office measures towards the colonies during the war was to 
preserve the geld and foreign exchange reserves of the UK. .Colonial governments 
were instructed to restrict the import of consumer goods "and to instigate a system 
of import licences. By 194-1, therefore most of the colonies had been brought into 
some system of price control for their principal products and many of them were 
asked to join bulk purchasing arrangements in order to maintain essential supplies 
for Britain during the war. The Secretary of State for the Colonies had sent a 
circular on economic policy which stressed the need to increase the flow of 
colonial'psupplies for war purposes and to reduce to a minimum all colonial demands 
on the general resources of labour and materials.1"1" 
By the end of the Second World War, the; formulation of a new colonial7' 
development policy be,came imperative, given the changed position of Britain ih 
• • } •• \ • • / the world economy. The measures of state socialism's.being implemented in post-war 
fn: 6,7 and 8 /from p.S. • 
6. Douglas Wpodruff, The Story of the British Colonial Empire (1939) p.25. 
7. For a full examination of the relationship between the settlers and the 
local- administration refer to MacGregor Ross., Kenya from Within, Revised edition, 
(Frank Cass, 1968). . -*' " j 
8. Margery Perham, 'Lugard' quoted in J.M. Lee, Op.Cit;, pg.43^ 
9. Swainson, op. cit., p. 4. 
10. For further details of the retrenchment undertaken by the colonies in the 
_1930* see E.A.Brett, Colopialism and Underdevelopment in East AfricaJ the Politics of 
^ snomic-ebans©^ 1919-1939, (Nairobi, Heinemann, 1973), p. .143 
11. J.M. Lee-s^ -op. cit. , p. 47. 
/ 
A 
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Britain, the Labour Party considered to be unsuitable for operation in the 
Colonies. Creech Jonesjthe Secretary of State for the Colonies,felt that 
the 'poverty of nature and backwardness of people' were unsuitable for 
'European' socialism. Rather,the post war 'new deal' for the colonies simply 
asserted a new version of native paramouncy, where- money and specialist 
personnel were to be provided for every colony.to promote 'development and 
social welfare'. Officials at the Colonial Office felt that socialist 
objections in Britain to the evils of monopoly capitalism in the colonial 
territories had been partly answered by the machinery set up for marketing 
colonial products during the war. Creech Jones had to resist strongly the 
• pressure exterted by the Labour 'left wing' to nationalise certain large trading 
12 firms operating in the colonies, such as the United Africa Corporation. 
After I-the war, the increased production of raw materials and 
industrial output also, was regarded as a priority in British colonial., policy. 
The immediate need of British government policy from the point of view of 
'national.interest' was to reduce the large deficits that existed; to the tune 
of £311m in 1948. The government was aware that one method of reducing these 
deficits and in general increasing the competitiveness of British industrial 
firms was to channel government resources into the areas of primary production 
in the colonial territories as well as encouraging manufactured commodities 
in those areas. As the Commission on Colonial Primary Products was to stress 
after its formation in 1947, an increase in colonial production was to be seen 
not merely as a measure to meet the; immediate emergency, but as a long term 
contribution to the 'suitability of the sterling area and to European recon-
struction plans'. Furthermore, '..It will remain necessary to develop supplies 
outside the Western hemishphere and deduce European dependence onf foodstuffs 
and raw materials from the dollar area, if the pattern of foworld trade is to 
13 I be restored to equilibrium'. The idea was, therefore to increase the exports 
of primary products from British colonies to the USA £nd dollar areas, and also 
t o lessen imports of manufacture goods from those areas, by encouraging British 
firms to; expand production of industrial goods in the colonies themselves. In 
the words of Lord Tregarno, the chairman of. the CDC-. '.. 'The reason why we look 
to the Colonies is that their products- food and raw materials- are more i 
'""acceptable to the United States and some other areas than manufactured goods. 
The total value of imports of manufactured goods into the USA in 1947 from all 
Ibid., p. 75. 
These details are to be found in the first "Annual Report of the CDC 
12. 
13. 
in 1948. 
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sources amounted to some £250 m. The total imports of good and raw material 
were upwards of £1,150, or more, than four times their imports of manufactured 
goods from all countries. !..I mention these figures only to show the relative 
possibilities as between American imports of manufactures and of food and 
raw materials and to show that sterling and the balance of world trade are 
likely to gain more from Colonial products than from manufactured exports to 
14 
America! Thus colonial products being exported to areas was the first 
priority and the next was to ensure that the colonies produced manufactured ' 
goods themselves or imported them from Britain ratner than bought outside the 
the sterling area. British industrial capital was obviously not concerned with 
'national interest' as such, in terms of dollar deficits. However, the needs 
of British industrial firms were to move into colonial areas and set up production 
units under protected conditions in order to increase their hold over internal 
colonial markets for manufactured goods. 
The overall effect of these altered economic conditions at the 
metropolis gave rise to the emergence of a definite 'development policy' towards 
the colonial territories. The chief instrument for implementing this policy 
was fhe Colonial Development and Welfare Act of 1940, which superceded the old 
Colonial Development Act of 1923 which had provided a small number of grants 
to Colonial territories, (by 1936 it had only provided £3m of such grants).15 
The ,CD & W Act made £120m available to the colonial governments for a period of 
I 
10 years, and the further supplementary Acts of 1949 and 1950 which increased 
the total amount to £140m also extended the size of the central reserve and i • > the amount that could be paid in any one year. About 40% of the funds from 
"I c 
this act went towards education, health services,. housing and water supplies. 
The structural changes in the Colonial. Office implemented after 1945, however, 
did not. mean any corresponding changes in the financial relationships between 
Britain and its colonies. The programme of public expenditure, which the CD & W 
Act of 1940 inaugurated was implemented through the existing administrative 
structures. Each colonial administration remained responsible for balancing its 
own.budget, and the path of development was obliged to follow the traditional 
lines of communication. Assuming that capitalist development in the colonies was 
progressive in the Lugard. sense of the 'civilising mission' of colonial powers, 
the official emphasis after the war was not only on capital for development but 
14. From a press reprint of a speech given to ah audience of Liverpool 
businessmen concerned with colonial commerce on 22.B.48, by Lord Trefgarne, 
the Chairman of the CDC. 
15. Lord Hailey, An African Survey, (Revised edition, Oxford University Press, 
1956), p.1323. 
16. J.M. Lee, op.cit., p.85. / 
/ . 1 
? 
- 7 -
also on knowledge and skills. Therefore, one of the main reasons for 
emphasising the value of public corporations to sponsor development in the 
Colonies was that such bodies could train their personnel; this followed 
the Overseas Resources Development Act of 1948. 
This doctrine of the Public corporation was sold to the Colonies 
by the Colonial Office, and each territorial government after the war was 
at liberty to establish its own public corporations and the whole bias of 
administrative structure was strongly in favour of territorial bodies. 
Indeed the whole discussion on public enterprise in British government 
circles reflected the issue of nationalisation over which the two major 
political parties In the country-the Conservatives and the Labour Party, dis-I ; ' . 
agreed most strongly. As was illustrated earlier on, the 'left wing' of the 
Labour Party demanded the takeover by government cf large trading and mining 
corporations, a move which was resisted by the Labour government. The govern-i * ment reached a compromise solution on this issue, whereby the newly established 
public, corporations such as the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) and the 
Oversea? Food Corporation (OFC) should not interfere with the management of the 
trading companies but should buy a controlling interest in their share capital 
to make their affairs 'more accountable' to the public. The CDC, however, in 
/ 
the role of international finance capital, backed by the state, was to be used 
/ to encourage the move of priyate capital into important areas of the colonial 
/ / economies that would not initially be able to attract/private capital. The r 
Overseas Bescurces Development Act of 1948 was, therefore,intended to be the 
commercial counterpart to ,the C.D. S W Acts by providing for the creation 
fficafiy lesi§ne^¥of?aperov!rn?R o^t&i^'ihfaSMs^^g^SunlS^^cheme 
fromrtbe United Africa Corporation. The OFC had an initial capital of £50,000,000 and 
the balance from the groundnut scheme was to be used for encouraging private 
18 capital into other food growing projects in the colonial territories. The OFC 
collapsed along with the groundnut scheme in the early 1950's, and the corporation 
/ < was formally.dissolved in 1954. 
--'Thus, this 'new deal' for'the colonies was fundamentally concerned with 
providing the territories with extended infrastructure and services, with the 
•"""hope that this would stimulate private capital investment in agriculture and 
industry— In general, economic services now provided within the development 
17. 
18. 
Ibid, p.114. 
A. Wood, The Groundnut Affair (Bodley Head LtdLondonv 1950) , p. 85. 
/ 
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plans were confined to''measures! involving such objectives as conservation 
of basic physical resources, provision of public utilities' and research. 
/ 
However, the state was prepared to provide direct investment in colonial 
enterprises through government f5_nance institutions such as the CDC and OFC, 
where the initial capital expenditure was too heavy to attract commercial • j • 
investors. Nevertheless9 the ultimate aim of such state finance capital 
was to attract private capital and hand over the management of such enter-
prises to"them. / y. . - " 
I 
i - .-».?• • 
B) THE KENYAN ADMINISTRATION AND THE EMERGENCE OF A DEVELOPMENT POLICY IN POST-WAR KENYA. / 
/ 
The post-wan years in Kenya colony were to see a rapid expansion 
of industrial development supported in varying degrees by the local 
administration.. In 1^39, as we have seen elsewhere, . the scope of industry 
was limited to the processing of agricultural products, but by 1954 for 
the first time in the Colony's history, the geographical net income . 
attributable to manufacturing industry was greater than that attributable 
19 
to European agriculture. There was a large absolute increase in.the 
capital formation attributable to ''Other Private Sectors' from £64.7m 
to £123.8m between 1946-1952 and 1953-1958 respectively. The amount 
attributable to European agriculture did not.decline in absolute terms, 
but rather in proportional terms from 16.4% of total capital formation 20 in the 1946-52 period.to 9.8% in the 1953-58 period. 
• Before the Second World War, in the East African colonies 
British manufactured goods were•experiencing quite severe competition' 
from the equivalent goods of countries such as Japan and the United 
States. Britain had by 1938 lost its dominance over the East African 
market in terms of volume of imports in several manufactured goods, such 
as cement, cotton piece goods and aluminium. The response of individual 
\ . . . - . . • . . . . . • • . : . . 
19. East African Royal Commission Report 1953-1955 , (Government 
Printer, Nairobi 1955J, p. .83. 
I 
20. H.'W. ..Ord,. The .Kenya Economy, as a whole, 1929-1952: National Income, 
Investment'"and the Balaance of Payments, (Mimeo Edinburgh, .1976), p. 10. 
This contains an analysis of capital formation in Kenya from" 19.23-1958. 
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industrial firms which exported to the colonies before the war was to go 
behind the tariff wall and produce within Kenya. The competitive conditions 
facing British capitals in Kenya colony hav£ been outlined elsewhere. 
Merchant capital on a global scale was, by the end of the Second World War 
in many parts of the world compelled to transform itself into industrial 
capital by investing directly in production or be absorbed by industrial 
capital. This trend in the movement of capitals was becoming apparent in 
post-war Kenya, and the establishment of production units inside the colony 
after 1945 by British industrial capital was in several cases facilitated 
by the interventions of international finance capital. It is the changing 
role of British industrial capital and the increased level of intervention 
by international finance capital to support productive investments in 
colonial territories that we shall be concerned with in this oart. As 
we have said, the role of the metropolitan state in backing up the movement 
of industrial capital into .the territories is quite distinct from the 
pre-war pattern. Although industrial capital and 'the state' are not 
synonymous, they are intertwined at certain levels, and it is these links 
that we shall be concerned to examine. 
: This mechanism of capitalist expansion into industrial forms 
of enterprise in the colonies, was pperating in an immediately favourable 
environment in post-war Kenya. Kenya's agriculture had not only been 
considerably developed since 1918', but the war itself had given a great 
boost to primary production in the territory. During the war years it 
transpired that-the territories' main natural products were of increasing 
importance to the war effort and the production of the following agricultural 
products wass expanded: sisal, pyrethrum, coffee, tea, maize,wheat ana 
other foodstuffs. Also the Wartime interference with the shipping routes to 
East Africa forced Kenya to^implement a certin amount of 'import substitution' 
albeit rather primitive„ to replace goods formally imported, such as oils, 
acids, bricks, tiles wooden articles chemicals etc. Therefore, by 1945, the 
three territories were in/a distinctly flourishing position having 
conserved foreign exchange on imports and with a significant surplus from 
agriculture having been realised. 
4 
The arrangements for administering this new metropolitan aid to 
the colonies rested/on initiatives from the territory concerned r. but after 
the wartime experience of a centrally directed economy, a strong precedent / 1 "' —. had been set with'the local'administration. By i945, the administration 
was less under %hf influence of the settler class than before the Second War, 
- 10 - IDS./WP 276 
and during 1950's as we have said, the proportion of capital formation 
derived from European agriculture had fallen considerably. The Mau Mau 
insurrection spelt the death blow also to settler political power, so 
that during the mid 1950's the metropolis was able to implement its 
policies untrammelled by local opposition. The local administration, 
however, remained responsible for administering the greatly increased 
level of metropolitan direct aid, which had risen from £0.1m in 1938 
to £1.6m in 1950, the figure rising further to £10.8m in 1955 (which would 
be accounted for by the Emergency in Kenya at the time, 
As early as 1949, the Ministry of Commerce in Kenya Colony issued 
a press release emphasising the 'new direction' of economic policy in 
the colony,'... Kenya is on the eve, as indeed is all of Africa, of large 
scale industrial development .. this era began during the war when abnormal 
conditions closed the usual sources of supply of many articles and 
compelled East Africa to look more closely at its own industrial potential' , 
and they further anticipated a rapid expansion in industrial development 
in East Africa,',., there is of course no lack of capital. In 1948 alone 
£23m was invested in new private and public companies and 9/10th of this 
money went into industry. Over the last three years between 1945 and 1948 
21 22 at least £54,000,000 was invested in new companies in Kenya..'. 
Therefore, after the war, central government policy was in accord 
with that of the local administration: to develop agricultural and industrial 
production in the three East African territories. The move towards 
industrialisation in all the colonial territories was actively supported by-
international finance capital which emanated both from private and state 
sources (such as the commercial banks and the CDC respectively). Thus in 
the post-war colonial situation finance capital played more than its usual 
23 
role of 'book-Keeper to productive = capital, particularly state finance 
capital which intervened directly to stimulate production in certain areas 
and encourage private capital to invest. 
The East African Royal Commiss ion Report (1953—1955) was designed to 
21. This refers to circulation capital. 
22. East African Standard (EAS), 21.6.49, (in KNA MCI 6/674). 
23. The relationship between productive capital and the working class is 
always decisive, in determining the mode of capitalist production but the 
framework, within which it is organised is set by circulation capital - notably 
finance capital-in its role as book-keeper. For a fuller exposition of this 
point see: G. Kay, Development and Under-development, a Marxist Analysis, 
(Macmillan Press, London, 1975). pp. 90-93. ' ~ 
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1.951 83.8 14.0 - 24.4 -20.6 101.6 5.3 96.3 
1952.,., W CD ro (—' 16.4 32.2 -23.6 107.1 - 4.9 102.2 
1953 76.4 20.9 31.4 -•23.1 107.6 5.0 102.6 
1954 83.6 33.8 „,36.6 .. . . —--2.7...0- .. 127.0 5.0 122.0 
1955 103.5 34.2 . . •: 45.6 - -32.4 150.9 5.7 145.2 
1956 103.3 34.8 48.8 -24.9 162.0 6.9 155.1 
1957 124.4 32.2 47.2 -31.7 172.1 6.6 165.5 
1958 120.9 31.5 40.0 -17.0 175.4 7.0 168.4 
1 . _ 
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recommend a 'new development policy' for Kenya Colony. This commission 
outlined two measures by which the government should promote economic 
development; one which would remove the existing disadvantages and the 
other which would offer special inducements to investors. In the first 
group they included improvements to transport facilities the provision 
of regular water supplies and the removal of restrictive regulations. In 
the second, as part of the inducements to investors they included subsidies, 
tax concessions and monopolistic priviledges, which-were to be offered 
particularly to overseas enterprises or immigrants as an incentive to 
settle in East Africa. They further recommended that '...if there should 
be a climate of opinion that is not obviously well dsposed to a continual 
inflow of external capital and enterprise, the amount of the inducement 
would have to be correspondingly increased'. On the question of enticing 
new enterprises from overseas, the Commission was not of the opinion that 
East Africa was in -a particularly good -position regarding the attraction of 
international capital to the colonies,-'... apart from the fact that East 
Africa does not, at present have great-natural advantages to offer, there 
is the consideration that the economic importance to East Africa is greater 
than the-economic importance of .East. Africa_to external capital and enterprise, 
- • • - • • • 25 due, among other things.to the small size of the internal market..'. 
(C) INDUCEMENTS AND INCENTIVES TO INVESTMENT: 
It was for these reasons that the colonial administration in Kenya 
found it necessary .to construct a special network of inducements to foreign 
capital to set up industrial enterprises in East Africa. The Royal Commission 
reflected the reticence shown by the colonial administrations of the three' 
East African territories in actually constructing a comprehensive protective 
• framework -for industry inrthe region;, ';,,.'. the creation, of '-monopolies or 
semi-mcnopolies apart from anything else is likely to intensify rather than 
mollify any suspicions which, may be generated £>y external enterprise and it 
is particularly difficult to justify if it-is done at a time when public 
is , policy endeavouring to break down the restrictions which1: retard the 
26 development of indigenous population. 
24. .Royal Commission Report (1955), op.cit., p. 77. 
25. Ibid. 
26. . Ibid, p. 78. 
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i) Training? 
One of the biggest obstacles "to the encouragement of productive 
investments in the colonies, in the opinion of both the local and central 
administrations was the low standard of productivity of the labour force in 
East Africa. It therefore became necessary for much of the aid under 
the CD & W acts of 1946, and 19.50, to be channelled into the training 
of a workforce suitable for servicing industrial enterprises, and 
Increasing agricultural production, 
The position of the metropolitan government on the question of 
labour was summarised by Sir G. Ord-Brown in a paper presented in 1945 
in his capacity as labour advisor to the Secretary of State for the colonies, 
'... the dominant problem throughout East Africa is the deplorably low 
standard of efficiency of the worker, that is to say the exceptionally 
small output characteristic of the entire country, which has always been 
27 
a conspicuous weakness in the East African economy.1 A subsequent 
statement by the Governor of Uganda in his for.ward to that country's 
Development Plan was the official solution to this situation which 
was likely to hinder investment in the African territories,'.. Given 
better feeding, and medical s onditions of employment 
and the stimulus of a full range of goods at attractive prices in the shops, 
it is surely not unduly sanguine to look for a marked improvement in the 
matter of idleness, indifference ,and irresponsibility which are such " . 2 8 disturbing features of the present day African labourer and cultivator'. 
The Member for .Cbmmerce and Industry in Kenya Colony put forward his 
official point of view on the matter of labour my view is that 
we must direct the basis of the education towards the technical and practical 
angle', xjie Royal Commission supports this view; '... Here we submit 
that the difficulties whcch stand in the way of direct African 
participation in "the field of industry are not primarily financial, but 
proceed from a lack of skill and experience... it is on the removal of 
this deficiency that a public policy anxious to promote African participation 29 : . in new development should concentrate'. :; 
t i 
• . < 
27. British East Africa, Overseas Economic Survey^, (Government Printer, 
London, March, 1948), p. 2. 
28. OES, Ibid. \ 
29. Royal Commission, op.cit., Chapter 10. v. 
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Indeed, metropolitan policy was also very squarely in favour of 
channelling large amounts of aid into provision of education and 
services which would primarily assist indigenous populations in the 
j 
colonies. Thus. 43%.of the expenditure included in the Development Plans 
for the Colonial territories -was"allocated to 'social development', 
which included education, housing and water supplies. (Before the war, 
the settlers who virtually controlled state policy had largely prevented 
any local resources being channelled into welfare for the African 
population). The central, administration had the motive for social 33 
development and the funds to support their policies, 
ii) Tariffs: 
It is important not to overstress the 'Interventionist' nature 
of local S "t at 3 do1-_c y towards development in the colony immediately 
after the war. In 1846 the Development Committee noted, 'v'e do not 
consider that tariff walls should b$ erected to bolster up uneconomic 
or inefficient local industries, and we do not think it right that the 
people of this country should be compelled by the Government's fiscal 
policy to purchase local manufactures when better imported articles are 
available under a normal import duty policy.'"' 
Indeed, the use of import tariffs as a consistent form of protection 
for local industries was not conceived until 195j. Then, the attitude 
of the local administration over the issue of protective tariffs altered 
radically, which was largely in response to concerted pressure from both 
local and foreign manufacturing firms. Therefore, in. Id53, for the first 
time a fully protective tariff was included in the schedule, the 
administration th is giving a coherent support to Import-suhstuting 
industrialisation in the colony. However, t'..r effect of thes? measures 
was limited and a thorough attempt at providing a framework for protected 
32 industry was not made until the early 1960's.~*" • - • ' t 
£ f ' ' : I - . " , . ' 
30. J.H. Lee, op.cit:. , p. 127. 
31. Kenya Development Programme, (Govamment Printer, Nairobi, 1946). 
32. Richard Eqlina:The Oligopolistic Structure and Competitive 
Characteristics of Direct Toreim Investment - in Kenya's Tanufacturin,-
Sector, in R. Kaolin sky (ed), Readings on the '•iultinational Corporation 
in Kenya, (00? East Africa, forthcoming),. p. ~ 
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Having said this however, it is necessary to compare the 
post-war tariff structures with those existing in the 1930s. Although 
a comprehensive system of tariff protection was not applied to industry 
until 1958, nevertheless, the tariff structure post-war represented quite 
a radical departure from that which had existed before the Second War. 
The tariff structure remained the same between 1930, after the 
Report of the Tariff Committee, until the war period. During these 
years a whole series <?f surcharges.were introduced in the basic tariff, 
with the object of maintaining revenue at as high a level as possible 
and. also discouraging the consumption of commodities which could not be 
regarded as essential. On.most manufactured items an automatic 10% 
surcharge was imposed, a higher rate being imposed on some of.those 
items produced locally. For instance, wood & unmanufactured timber 
carried surcharge duty.of 100%, glassware, china and porcelain(100%), 
Motor Spirit (66%),.Sugar (100%), Tea, (100%), Tobacco (175%), Dairy 
Products, (ghee, cheese, butter) 100%, Beer (25%), Soap (100%), and 
Wires (100%);, all of these items except motor spirit were produced 
33 
locally. Therefore the wartime conditions had necessitated a certain 
degree of import protection even before it became part of official 
policy. Suspended duties were also introduced on a certain manufactured 
goods and primary goods produced within East Africa, which could be 
imposed at the discretion of each territorial government. Unlike the 
situation before 1939, the local administrations had the option to impose 
protective tariffs if they should find them.necessary to support a 
particular industry. However, potential investors before the 1958 scheme 
of protective tariffs came into operation were compelled to rely on dutry 34 
remissions rather than direct protection. Even by 1955, it is clear 
that the attitude of the administration was shifting towards provision 
of positive protection for industrial concerns. A government report 
on 'Economic Assistance for Primary and Secondary Industries (1955)' 
emphasised the inadequacy of the existing duty drawback scheme; . 
/ 
33. Colonial Blue Books 1938-1946, contain the tariffs--'on all items. 
34. Report of the Planning Committee, Ministry of .Commerce and 
Industry, clause 9. 
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' .-.•'.we consider that appropriate assistance to an industry should be 
granted 7oto the industry as a whole ... and -his should be provided 
fo?-> by a -pecial amendment to the customs tariff. It is reasonable 
that a local industry to which protection is given should enjoy protection 
up to a maximum-of 20% against a comparable finished product.and 10% 
against the imported equivalent semi-processed article.. In a country 
:>j'ae:re the netting up of a new industry is still a venture carrying 
considerable risks, it is,doubtful wh ;ther a fair return on capital 
employment is enough to induce owners of capital to face the risks.'35 
Eglin's oaper on Oligopoly"" cont nds that the ultimate intro-
duction of a comprehensive system of protective tariffs corresponds with 
the date of establishment of a foreign investment, and a list of 
examples (Tb\, 5)lead to a conclusion that tariff protection in those cases 
was offered in response to pressure from the foreign investor. Concessions 
were offered to potential investors before 1958, but they took different 
forms, which tends to relate to the degree of pressure exerted by the 
company concerned. For instance, as we shall see in the later case 
stMv on ccement, the British Standard Portland Cement Company had 
consistently refused to install a cement plant until appropriate 
protective measures against Imported cement were agreed to by the local 
administration. 
(D) Government Bodies promoting Industrialisation and Industrial Licencing 
Various government created bodies emerged from the wartime 
-experience to support industrialisation in the colony. The earliest of 
these was the Industrial Management 3oard which was established in 1944 
under the Defense Regulations, for the purpose of supplying the armed 
fore ;s with various manufactured items such as locally made crockery, 
sulphuric acid for batteries, pottery, pfrethrun, extract for cooking fat-
etc. The sole shareholders during the war had been the government who 
were involved to the extent of £3505>00. The Board paid over its small 
profit to the Treasury in 1945, and then sold 2/3rds of its holdings to 
the CDC with the Industrial Management Board retaining a l/3rd holding 
.'. ~v .. 'in ". on behalf of its successor, East African Industries Limited."' The type 
35. Economic Assistance for Primary and Secondary Industries, (Govern-
ment Printer, Nairobi, 1255)vp. - • -
36. Eglin, op.cit. 
- . . . e 
37. "emo on Industrial Development m Kenya, prepared for dop-Tones 
the Member for Commerce and Industry by MCI 16/5/52, (in KNA MCI 5/674). 
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of enterprises that grew up under this umbrella of state support were 
engineering works, woodworkings, bricks, ceramics, and tiles. The brick 
works were part of the East African Industrial Management Board, 
and that: portion of' East African Industries was later .sold off to 
Refractories limited, whilethe soap making business was hived off to 
international capital in the form of Unilever Limited, in 1953. 
The Industrial Management Board in turn had its activities 
taken over by the Industrial Development Council (a forerunner of 
the present Industrial and Commercial Development Corporation, ICDC) 
which was set up under ordinance 63 Of 195^ and was designed to 
'facilitate-' the industrial and economic development of the Colony 'by 
initiatingassisting or expanding industrial ', commercial 'and other 
.38 . . . . . . . . . . - . . ' . . _ . . 
undertakings in the Colony'. The IDC- was not the sole source of a 
finance organisation. Furthermore the financial assistance was to 
incorporate new projects rather than those already underwayi.through 
private enterprise. These new enterprises sponsored by the IDC were 
to. be partnerships with industrial firms: with a, specialised knowledge 
.of that particular business. . v. ,' .,-
The recommendations of the report of the Development Committee 
summarised the government's policy towards industrial development: 
A system of. industrial, licencing should be established to 
/ 
encourage industrial enterprises which .appeared unlikely to come 
to Kenya without some form of protection; 
that a government finance corporation should be set up with a 
capital of £50,000, which would in -.ddition to assisting 
industrial development oh commercial lines, time its investment 
so as to stimulate purchasing power in times of falling prices; 
the creatim of a board of industrial research; 
the creation of a\statistical department on a permanent basis; 
that East African 'Power & Lighting should be encouraged to 
extend its areas of 'potential development; 
that the Trade Advisory Committee should be reorganised as an 
Economic and Industrial Advisory Board; 
that a propaganda campaign should be undertaken to explain to 
the African peoples the need for increased output of work and 
Ibid. 
1) 
2) 
3) 
M 
6) 
7) •> 
33. 
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that research should he conducted into the problem of finding 
an incentive for the African to advance.himself; 
3) A technical and commercial institute should he established and 
legislation enapfed to ..make it compulsory for employers to. . 
.permit employees to attend clas_s.es. during working, hours; 
9) r... a factory.inspectorate should be set up: • 
10) that the development. committee pursue a general policy- of seeking 
to encourage and assist private enterprise to establish and develop 
industries in the colony. 
All of these provisions were, made statutory during-the 1950's 
and they laid the basis for the role of the state in Industry in Kenya, 
to the present. In addition, .after the war (I9U0) the. government 
appointed an economic and commercial adyisor who in 19^8 became . 
Secretary for Commerce and Industry with executive powersin the. same 
year he was made a. member of the executive, council. In_ 19U3 a. 
Board of Commerce, and Industry was appointed by a Legco resolution with 
the following terms of references. . ,L 
a) to keep under•constant review- commercial and industrial aspects of 
customs and excise and to make recommendations., to SCI on any. matters 
affecting industrial development which mi,sht be referred to it; 
b) to advise the SCI on policy concerning the encouragement and develop-
ment of industries and mining in the Colony. This Board was a fully 
representative body..'..incTuding members nominated by the unofficial, 
members associations:,-the--.association cf. Chambers of Commerce etc. 
Industrial Licencing: 
Trom the outset, licencing for capital goods industries must be 
distinguished from licencing for primary products, such as tea or coffee. 
39- : Ibid. 
HO. .: j: •Licencing .for various agricultural-commodities • such-as coffee was 
introduced as early as the 1930's to control the advance of indigenous 
capitalism in those areas- After the war growers of pineapples, pyrethrum, 
tea and others were- required to be licenced. - :; 
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The overall direction of state policy towards industrialisation 
.in the post-war period was embodied in an-Industrial'Licencing .Ordinance 
passed-.by the legislatures of Uganda, Kenya and Tanganyika in 19^ 8'. 
This.--game under the direction of the East African High Commission and the 
ordinance vested executive powers in an East African Industrial Council 
as 'early as' 19^3. This^Council was composed of one official and 2 non-
official ^members from each of-the 3 territories. This body was empowered 
to authorise the issue of licences for the manufacture of articled under 
"the Industrial Licencing Ordinances which were enacted in each of the 
1+1 
3 territories on identical terras. The legislation of the Industrial 
Licencing Ordinance provided that 'no person shall engage, in the scheduled 
industries without a licence granted by the council.. licences will be 
refused if the capital, skills,or raw materials available to the applicant 
are deemed to be inadequate.' The official 'rationale' for such a policy 
was to avoid what was called 'uneconomic competition' between different 
industries in each of the territories. This was interpreted as meaning 
that a number of small investments in industries being made immediately 1+2 
after the war were undermining the prosperity of larger scale investments. 
The ini t-ialfervour on behalf of the administration in licencing industries 
soon changed, and whereas in 19^2 there were scheduled industries, by 
I9U8 these had dropped to only six which included some large scale invest-
ments : leather and leather products, boots and shoes, (Bata), soap (EAI), 
cement, vegetable oils, and acids.. The system tended to support the 
concentration of production amongst several large firms, and the decisions 
on which firms were to be accorded licences were taken on an ad hoc basis 
in response to requests from individual firms. The whole system ended in 
]p58 with the rationalisation of the tariff system along protective lines, 
and by 1959 the industries scheduled under East African licencing 
legislation included: cotton yarn piecegoods and blankets, woolen blankets, 
fabric snun from soft fibres, steel drums, glassware, metal window frames, 
and enamelholloware. Of a total of 2k licences 3 were foreign. 
f -
.j 
4I. Memo..MCI on Industrial Development, op. cit. 
b2. Egl.in, op.;cit. , p. -18. ;• • -. '• -.•' 
k3. These did however include some of the most significant industries 
in the Colony at that time. 
Reports of the East African Industrial Council. 
- 20 - IDS./WP 276 
• - ;•• This;perhaps nakes clear the-rather erratic .operation of 
industrjai.tlieeneing. in-Kenya in the 19.5Q's,, which Eglin..concludes., served 
to prevent a highly competitive, industrial:structure from emerging,. 
• Howeyer:> >not-:only large,foreign firms benefitted, from., the. licencing , :.,••.• 
system; as.it operated before 1958, but a- number - of -larger local, enter-, 
prises (mostly Asian).-were also-able to take advantage of the licencing 
U5" 
scheme. The, state was concerned to encourage-the concentration of 
production in large units, be they, foreign or locally; owned., which is made 
evident by the small number of firms in each industrial sector, by the mid 
1960's. • •  .-niai".: ' srF " . : :r :/ :.•:'.' v^.:••••.- ' :" 
• - i." . ".;./* rfys*?s>q cf' ;" t:rL • "r i - sacien.chiO ".• i-J 
iL . ..Cionuoo er'j b:• 'r • :-a 2 . : ;.<o -.i 
':t ~ h . • xxv&Bi1 v.«?7 • 21:-:-. .  L?^  'r- :-r/ '-r ": is. 
. r .. 
'. '•".'. /"••• "•.••vcr- • •..:• . . . J 7 0" .'."••:. ..J-' "• -. •• r;j •. • 
.: ' ' ... • ~ • .: • • ," .T.C'C " ': ' .'''.'" 
, r : ••!::•. 
-.< xir? 
• i 
U5. For instance, in ~1955" wh'en~the"textile secot was largely Asian 
owned, the industries scheduled ujder'the East African licencing legislation 
by 1959 included cotton yarn, pietegoods and blankets, woolen blankets 
and piecegoods, fabric spun with soft fibres.-, etc. in" Eglin, op. cit., 
P-. 1.3- ; ,, •- • •. ..,. , . ,. . . , ... .,. . ,. ._,. .. 
- 24 - IDS/WP 276 
(E) FINANCE FOR DEVELOPMENT. THE COMMONWEALTH DEVELOPMENT CORPORATIONCDC) 
AND EAST AFRICAN INDUSTRIES 
i) Finance for Development: 
Productive capital and finance capital are always interdependent 
rather than competitive, and their profits come from the same source. 
Therefore it is clear that all industrial investment will be facilitated 
4-6 
by financial capital in the role of 'book-keeper'. The industrial 
expansion in Kenya after the Second War was financed from both local and 
foreigh sources, although the latter predominates in this case. 
It> has been .shown before that the state took a more active, role than 
previously (before 19.39) in . encouraging infrastructural development in 
the colony by supporting' hoth agricultural and industrial.projects. 
The metropolitan state, through the CD and W Acts as we have seen, 
provided official grants to the colonies to be used for provision of 
utilities and services, in order to encourage, an increased level of 
production. Between 1929 and 1938 never more than £100,000 was dispensed 
in one year to Kenya and from 11 years, in 8 years no official grants were 
dispensed whatsoever in Kenya Colony. Table I) shows, however, the greatly 
increased level of official British government aid In the form of grants 
too the colony, the peak occuring during the Emergency with £10.8m in 1955. 
Also the amount of inflow of foreign 
D3TIVSTS CctO ital also increased, for 
instance before the war in 1939 'Private residual' net capital imports, 
into Kenya were only £0.3m, by 1946 this had risen to £6.2m and by 1953 
it had reached £21.2m. As Ord points out this foreign capital inflow was 
on much 'softer' terms than in the pre-war period, not only in respect of 
the grants in aid and development funds from the metropolis3 but also in 
respect of interest bearing loans and equity investments. Nominal interest 
rates and equity yields were low and their subsequent real burden on the 
balance of pajmients was reduced further by world wide inflation. Large -
numbers of loans for the colonies were raised on the London market 
assisted by Barclays Overseas Development Corporation in the role of 
46. G. Kay, op.cit., pi 91. 
47. H.W. Ord, op.cit., p. 6. 
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finance capital. Between 1950 and 1952, these loans? destined for 48 
East African territories averaged £17,000,000 per year. These 
loans were- used mainly by the local administrations to establish 
infrastructure and servicing developments such as roads, railways, 
housing, education and health services. These grants as we have seen • 
were supplemented by inflows of private finance capital from the 
metropolis and it is significant that of a total of £77.7 m borrowed 
by British African Dependencies on the London market between 1945 and the . 49 end of 1952, some £48.6 or 2/3rds went to. British East Africa. 
In the East African territories themselves, agricultural 
exports provided finance for industrial development. According to the 
new powers vested in the local colonial administrations to form bodies 
to assist development, the Industrial Development Council was created 
in Kenya in 1954 as a state finance capital to assist industrial 
enterprises. 
This ciiannelling of metropolitan finance capital was paralleled 
by the domestic accumulation of circulation capital within Kenya. 
There was a considerable increase in geographical net product in the 
years immediately following the war: the GITP of Kenya rose from 
£53,000,000 in 1947 to £103,000,0000 in 1951. The total African 
income, on the other hand (included in these figures), amounted to 
£26,000,000 and £40,000,000 in those years respectively, leaving in 
the two years approximately £27,000,000 and £63,000,000 of other income 
out of v/hich voluntary savings on any scale could be expected to come. 
The City Treasurer of Nairobi made a rough estimate as to the amount 
of Kenya's voluntary savings in 1951, which he calculated to be around 
10^ or somewhere between £3-6m. He further prepared a report on the 
amount of local money raised In Kenya between 1945;1952 which was 
estimated at a total of £14,396,215. This represented about 
£2,000,000 per annum, although it would have been somewhat lower in the 
earlier years and higher in the later years. The total figure for 
these years was broken down in the Treasurer's Report as follows: 
Gilt Edged £8,776,215 
Kenya Building Society £1,500,000 
Commercial & Industrial £4,120,000 
Total £14,396,215 
(Source: EAR Commission Report, 1955, p. 84). 
48. These were later supplemented by loans from the Internatinal Bank 
for Reconstruction and-Development (i^RD), details in the East African 
.RoyalsCommission, op.cit., pp. 81-85'' 
49. Ibid, p. 85. j . . 
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Private capital formation in Kenya reached its peak in 1955 when it 
50 
amounted to £30.,700,000 or 21% of the gross cash product. The main 
aim of the local administration was to encourage the flow of finance capital 
into the colony from the metropolis to support investments in industry. 
ii) The CDC and its role as a Finance Capital: 
The main arm of metropolitan policy in supporting development in 
the Colonies was the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC). Where the 
size of markets and low productivity did not attract commercial investors, 
the metropolitan state provided two organisations of international finance 
capital to 'subsidise' areas of production for British industrial capital 
until these became profitable. In some cases3 such as the groundnut scheme 
the state finance organisation - the Overseas Food Corporation was actually 
formed to undertake an investment which had been instigated by industrial 
capital. The Unilever Company wanted to undertake a groundnut scheme in 
Tanganyika to supply their oil extraction plants in the west, but they 
did not wish to undertake the heavy capital investment necessary to 
establish large scale growing areas in an undeveloped part of Africa-
This industrial capital, therefore, managed to put pressure on the 
British government to directly finance the project; with the United Africa 
Corporation as the managing agent.^ The government were favourable 
to these direct interventions to support industrial projects as there was 
a serious fats shortage in Britain at the time. The Overseas Food 
Corporation was set up with the main purpose of taking over the groundnut 
scheme from the managing agency of the UAC, by the Overseas Resources 
Development Bill of November 1947. This bill created two bodies, the 
CDC with a capital of £50,000,000 and the OFC with a capital of £50,000,000, 
The groundnut scheme it was estimated would cost the government £25,000,000. 
and the balance was to be used to support other food growing projects in 
the colonial territories. Thus the initiative behind the fateful 
groundnut scheme came from industrial capital-in this case Unilever'." 
50. Ibid, p. 85. 
51. A. Wood, op.cit., pp. 26-31. 
52. The groundnut scheme was unsuccessful for a variety of reasons. 
The use of lend-lease equipment obtained from American arms dumps after 
the Second War was not a good start. Most of the equipment was not suitable 
for the task at hand and very few of the machines had spare parts. The 
enormity of the project meant a very loose administrative control over the 
scheme by the Board of the 0FCs most of whom were not qualified to conduct 
the scheme in any case. The capital costs of the operation became too high 
and after several unsuccessful harvests the whole project ©ollapsed in 
1954 having cost the British taxpayer nearly £25,000,000! 
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of the CDC was that projects should be judged by their commercial 
viability, although it was expected that some undertakings would make 
substantial yields which would counterbalance losses in other areas. It 
was set in the role of a typical financial capital, acting as an agent for 
British industrial capital. The CDC accordingly invested itself in the capital ±or -commercial undertakings, and provided management contract 
share capital of enterprises, provided loan/facilities for some projects. 
The corporation also pressured many colonial administrations to encourage 
private industrial capital by waiving import duties on development goods 
and supplies such as fuel for agricultural machinery, and further pushed 
from - standardisation of tax relief in each, territory for projects 
relating to 'development'. The CDC considered that allowances for develop-
ment expenses should be. granted to potential.investors and in particular 
cases the corporation did succeed in reaching' agreements with the colonial 
governments on matters concerning rents, royalties and the waiving of. 
import duties on development goods. 
By December 1949 there were a total of 28 CDC undertakings in 
operation throughout the British colonies, with an aggregate 
capital of £14,187,000. Of these projects one third were in agri-
culture and the remainder in other activity divisions, such 
as engineering, finance, factories and forestry. The actual form 
of the first 28 CDC undertakings was mixed:^ 7 subsidiary 
companies which were either wholly owned by the Corporation in which 
they .had a controlling interest, 3 investments where the CDC held 
a minority interest, 3 loans or debentures to commercial companies, 
and one in which the Corporation acted as managing agents for the 
colonial administration. This government sponsored finance capital 
therefore, acted on a number of different, levels in order to 'raise 
:productivity the areas of both agriculture and secondary 
industry in the colonial territories. We will now turn to one 
particular CDC project in Kenya which was in fact the first 
industrial project the Corporation was to undertake. The case of 
East African Industries illustrates the role of international finance 
capital in laying the groundwork for the entry of industrial capital. 
(iii) East African Industries and the CDC: 
The Kenyan administration had in 1942 sponsored the establishment 
of the East African Industrial management Board to develop and produce 
essential manufactured items, whose supply had been cut off during the war. 
57. Ibid. 
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These products included pottery, bricks, oils and miscellaneous chemicals. 
(Although I do not have details of the type of. machinery employedit 
is clear that the level of technology was very low, and the plant was 
most likely composed of various second hand machine . modified by engineer-
ing works in Kenya). 
The government was pledged to dispose of its interests in the 
enterprise after the war, and after 1945 some units of the plant were 
{ 
sold privately but there remained the main body of the factory comprising 
the pottery, the refractory plant, the hydrogenation plant, the sulphuric 
acid and the general chemicals plant. As this was the type of industrial 
activity the CDC were pledged to assist, the cj^ oirtuaitywas not lost, ana 
in 19>49 East African Industries was formally constituted and the CDC 
agreed to participate with the Kenyan administration in the operation. 
The Corporation subscribed £500,000 of the £750,000 shares of EAI, with 58 / the government holding the balance. The agreement reached between EAI 1 
Ltd. and the Corporation in December 1950 provided that the CDC should 
act as • consultant and advisor to the company or. management, financial 
control, factory administration and on all matters concerning the manufacture 
1 and sales of EAI products. For these management services the company was 
to pay the Corporation a fee calculated at a rate of 5% of net profits 
59 I in each financial year. -; 
From the outset there was a strong demand for EAI products due . 
to the general shortage of such industrial products during and after the 
war. However the plant faced severe production difficulties due to under-
capitalisation of the plant and quite backward techniques of production. 
The most uneconomic unit of the factory was always the chemicals and acids 
plant, which had to import virtually all of its components. The refractories 
and the pottery plant both relied largely on local materials 3 but the 
hydrogenation plant utilised largely cotton seed oil from Uganda and 
58. CDC Reports, Ibid. \ 
59. Agreement between EAI and CDC 7.12.50, (in KNA MCI 6/244, 28). -
In addition to this fee , the corporation was to act as the ;company's " 
purchasing agent in- Britain and for these services the CDC received a 
further commission'' at the rate of 25% on the f ,o.b. value of purchases 
after deducting all discounts and allowances, provided that the value of 
such items exceeded £10,000 on any one contract, (Ibid). 
i 
• / 1. 1 / • 
/ < 
/ 
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copra oil from Tanganyika. Copra oil and cotton seed oil were used in 
the preparation of Kimbo cooking fat, ghee and liquid oil;^° from the 
earliest days of EAI's production the regular supply of particularly 
cotton seed oil from Uganda at a 'reasonable' price was a consistent 
61 
problem. The company based plans for an extension of the hydrogenation 
plant's capacity in late 1949 on the availability of groundnuts from the 
Overseas Food Corporation and Unilever growing scheme in Tanganyika, as 
well as cotton seed from Uganda. The former source of supply was never 
forthcoming in any quantity due to the failure of the groundnut growing 
project by 1955 , which meant that the EAI hydrogenation plant was largely 62 reliant on Ugandan cotton oil seed. 
By 1950, the EAI plant was faced by severe production problems. 
This state of affairs was expressed by the General Manager of EAI in 1949, 
'... the major effect of the commodity shortage is the necessity to carry 
larger stocks of imported material, thus tying up working capital. The 
63 
loan capital obtained from the CDC may prove inadequate '. This rising 
tide of production difficulties stemmed from both the difficulties in 
obtaining the imported inputs for the units that required them, and also the 
limited amount of capital for expansion of fixed assets. In fact, it is 
clear from the early balance sheet's- °f "the company, that the plant only 
continued in production in the years after the war on the profits from the 
hydrogenation plant. A paper presented to an EAI Board meeting in 1951 drew 
attention to some of the main difficulties faced by this new industry. First 
a complaint was raised that an improvement in the quality of EAI products was 
desperately needed (as none of the products met international quality control 
standards), and this would necessitate the immediate provision of additional 
equipment. Also the. company's financial affairs were reported to be in 
60. East African Industries Annual Reports, 1949-1952, (in KNA 6/244). 
61. EAI tried to encourage the establishment of a sunflower seed cultivation 
scheme which would secure a local supply of oil for the hydrogenation 
plant, but it did not come to anything. 
62. The allocation of Ugandan cotton seed oil to EAI in Kenya in 1952 
was 3,100 tons. 
63. Papers .prepared connection with EAI Board Meeting 3/52, (in KNA 
MCI 6/245). 
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chaos and no department in the EAI complex other than the hydrogenation 
plant had made sufficient profit in the previous 2 years to cover its 
fair proportion of general overheads. Furthermore, with, the.exception 
of acid, these units were unable even to supply the requirements of the 
East African market, and all their products were sub-standard. The 
question of inadequate protection was an important one with regard to the 
acid plantss'... without the assurance of protection against dumping there 
is no assured future for these industries in East Africa. (Continental 
caustic soda was apparently available in East Africa for under £20 per 
ton while EAI costs per ton caine TO £42). 
i 
The conclusion of this assessment of the fortunes of EAI were that 
'...we must either re-plan and re-equip all these projects with new or 
additional plant and possibly personnel, or else shut' them down as 
quickly as possiblef.^ ( 
However, the Board considered that given the previous capital inputs, the 
total abandonment of those potentially profitable industries was not 
justified. These prognostications concerning the efficiency of the EAI 
complex were reflected by the;:poor sales figures for these years; 
Table 2: EAI Sales November 1951 - March 1952 
£Si Nov. 1951 Dec. 1951 Jan. 1952 Feb. 1952 March r52 
Hydrogenation 
Acid Plant 
51,34$ 
2,350 j 
40,012 
1,252 
29,524 
2,048 
20,524 
2 ,470 
16,342 
1,494 
(Source: Memo from the Secretary of EAI to the Directors and 
i and dhairman EAI , 21/4/52),. 
\ 
/ 
The CDcLwho v/ere the EAI managing agents ,considered that poor 
organisation was;the main problem with the plant. As a report on EAI 
commissioned by •the CDC stressed, ' the importance of the problems 
confronting the company in realising surplus stocks of material, stores, 
and equipment cannot be over-emphasised. Stocks of some mateirals represent 
several years Requirements.., others, the purpose for which they are bought is not 
i Known, for instance by July 1952 the finished stocks of Kim Oil and XR Oil 
were high in- relation to sales and represented 3 times the value of the August 
i , 55 ./' sales.'. 
f . 
64. Board .'Report, Ibid/ 
65. Report prepared for th<^  CDC in EAI by the accountants, Peat, Marwick 
Mitchell-and Company, 25/9/ 
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The government were also most disatisfied about the declining 
fortunes of EAI, and could hardly wait for a suitable opportunity to 
off-load the enterprise , largely because it seemed to be a failure, 
but it is significant that most branches of government in the colony 
were against the involvement of government in a scheme which could 
compete with private enterprise. As a letter from the Secretary of 
Commerce and Industry to the Member for Commerce and Industry pointed 
out, '...you will recollect that there. has always been an objection in 
commercial circles to the government competing with private enterprise, 
and that was one of the reasons why it was decided to dispose of the interests 
of the old East African Industrial Management Board. We included a 
proviso in the V.ending agreement that we could dispose of up to 50% of 
our- holding to the public but had not done so.. this criticism of govern-
6 6 ment procedure will again be raised.' 
During 1950, the Ministry of Commerce and Industry EAI, and the 
CDC, held intensive discussions to consider the future of the plant and 
the CDC suggested moving the EAI plant to Jinja where it would be 
nearer the source of supply for oils. However, the Kenya government 
vetoed this plan as '.. the government will continue to be embarassed 
if it is going to operate in trading concerns which function outside 
Kenya, the aims of which must inevitably conflict with the existing 
system of inter-territorial control of foodstuffs and other essential 
commodities'.^ 
The Kenya government seems to have:been strongly in favour of the 
disposal of government interests in EAI as they were not in favour of 
stateowned enterprises and the Member for C & I stressed that the agreements 
between the government and the CDC ^ as being ignored by the latter, which 
was that the EA management Board plants, having been brought to a 
successful pilot stage of production should be expanded on a commercial 
5 8 basis.' The Secretary for Commerce and Industry expressed the same 
66. Letter from the Secretary for Commerce and Industry (SCI) to the 
Member for Commerce and Industry, A. Hope Jones, (in KNA MCI 6/445). 
67. Minute to the Member for Commerce and Industry from SCI, 23.8.50, 
(KNA MCI 6/445). 
68. Ibid. 
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sentiments; '..I would myself far sooner see the scheme woucd. up and 
have the machinery to advance money to enable promising industrial 
e nterprises to get started provided that such advances are made on a 
69 
sound commercial basis.' Ey 1951 the government had more or less 
decided that they wished to provide no further assistance to the industry, 
as the Secretary for Commerce and Industry suggested,' I think there is 
little prospect of any assistance being given to East African Industries, 
whose approach to normal commercial competition seems to be somewhat 
70 pathetic'. 
The Entry of International Capital: 
The CDC, therefore, were left with full responsibility for their 
'pilot'scheme and the. Corporation was required to find some method of 
salvaging this 'unceconomic' plant. During 1952 the CDC had directed a 
policy of retrenchment arid rationalisation for EAI, but the Corporation 
itself did not have either the resources or the technical expertise 
to transform the plant and perpetuate its operations. It was at this 
point that the role of the CDC as an international finance capital was 
made explicit, and the Corporation decided to hive off the plant with 
all its capital equipment to a British industrial firm. The CDC projects 
all encouraged the import of British capital goods at a time when these 
industries were suffering from inadeqaute capacity after the war. The EAI 
plant was to be no exception to this rule for any extension or modification 
to-the factory would involve not only the expertise of a particular firm 
but also the import of new machinery from British industrial supplies. 
The CDC invited the Unilever Company of the UK, with their long i 
established interests in the fats industry, to take over the ownership 
and management of the ailing EAI plant. This choice of a British firm 
which was predominant in the hydrogenation industry, to take over EAI 
was not mere coincidence. It will be recalled that the sister corporation 
set up in 1943 with the CDC was the Overseas Food Corporation (OFC), 
which had been primarily designed to administer the groundnut scheme 
in Tanganyika. This groundnut project had, indeed been partly instigated 
by the international firm, Unilever Ltd. The initiative, for Unilever 
participation in EAI in Kenya actually came from the CDC itself, but 
69. Letter from SCI to MCI, Hope-Jones, concerning government participation 
in EAI, 30.11.50, (in KNA MCI 6/445). 
70. Ibid. 
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Unilever's interest in the Tanganyikan groundnut scheme no doubt strongly 
influenced the decision. Although by 1S53 it was not yet clear whether 
the groundnut cultivation scheme in the neighbouring territory would 
succeed. Indeed, the Unilever company was clearly interested in investing 
in fats production in East Africa, for their original proposals for a 
groundnut scheme had been strongly influenced by their desire to diversify 
71 their production areas from West Africa, 
Therefore, by the end of 1953 an agreement between the CDC and 
the Unilever Company had been concluded, with the international firm 
taking a 50% equity interest b as well as taking the management responsi-
bilities. Thus, by 1954 the whole ownership structure had been altered 
leaving Unilever with 50%, the CDC with 33^% and the Kenya Government with 
a 15%% interest through the Industrial Management Corporation. However, 
despite their lowered equity interest in EAIthe CDC as a finance 
capital was still considerably committed to the project through the 
provision of loan capital; which in 1954 amounted to £35,000. 
In 1954, the new management of international capital immediately 
modified the existing: plant to conform with Unilever production methods. 
. 72 
New machinery was installed to manufacture Unilever --brands of margarine 
and cooking fats, which they intended to extend to low income African 
markets. Given the existing oil refinery, the next stage was to assemble 
new plant in order to start manufacturing soap and glycerine. As part 
of this 'rationalisation process/, the new EAI during 1955 disposed of 
all those production units which were not directly connected with Unilever's 
interests. Accordingly, the insecticides and refractory business were 
sold in early 1955 making a*Satisfactory profit'. 
71. There were some plans being formulated in 1975 between the EAI company 
and the Government of Kenya to foster a sunflower growing scheme thereby 
decreasing dependence on imported oils, and it is indeed surprising that 
the international capital did dot find it expedient to do this before, 
particularly during the 1950's and early 1960*3 when the company 
experienced so much difficulty in obtaining the cotton seed oil from Uganda. 
72, E.A.S. 4.8.55, the margarine factory, which was constructed at a 
cost of £120,000 with a capability of 6,000" tons of high grade margarine 
per year was opened in October 1955. The company used the Unilever brand 
name 'Blue 3and' for its products. The margarine plant was constructed 
by the Mowlem construction company, a British firm. 
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The EAI coupany under new management made a slew recovery with the 
infusion of capital and expertise, and this was reflected in the company's 
balance sheets (see table 4-); whereas in 1950 the company made a post tax 
loss of £1100, in the first-year of Unilever management it made a post 
tax profit of £35,000 (1955), with a turnover of £323,000. 
Meanwhile, the CDC continued to support the project through the 
provision of long term loans. Under the agreement of October 1953, the 
CDC had undertaken to lend EAI £100,000 repayable on 5 months notice at the 
expiration of 10 years or at any time thereafter. 3y the end of 1955, 
all this had been taken up, and this borrowing was to be used to finance 
73 
current assets. The soap project was financed by the capitalisation of 
a bonus issue of shares, amounting to £135,000, and further loans were 
granted to the project by the CDCffrfdis^ frial Development Bahk (Kenya 74 
Government £208,000) and from Unilever Parent Company (£208,000). 
The soap plant went into production in early 1957, producing familiar 
lines of Unilever's products such as Sunlights Lifebuoy, Lux Toilet and 
Lifebuoy Toilet soap, thus aiming at both the European and the low 
income African market. (The prices of these products were all lower than 
the current imported prices of soaps in the early 1950*s). 
Competition: When Unilever had acquired its holding in EAI in 1953, the 
Kenya government had offered an inducement to the fcompany that it should 
be able-to buy its requirements of oil at a -.>rice ;no less favourable 
75 
than other users?. This assurance indicated that the Kenya government 
was anxious to protect this particular foreign company from competition, I q g 
which dame mainly from the Asian owned oil mills in Uganda. The EAI 
hydrogenation plant had always suffered competition from the Asian oil 
millers, particularly those in Uganda. Before the Unilever take-over in i • 
1953, this was largely due to the small capacity of the EAI plant. A 
memo to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry from EAI in 7/49 suggested 
the purchase of new plant in order to render the factory more competitive 
in relation to the other- East African oil manufacturers. '..Regarding the 
purchase of the new plant, our .own plant is q 4 tons capacity and the 
other one is a 10 ton capacity. If our -competitors erect a 10 ton plant 
we shall not be able to compete as regards costs on the local market,, which 
'73. >4emo on borrowing powers of EAI from EAI to MCI, 7.5.55, (in KM A MCI 6/446) 
74. Ibid. -
75. To K. Mackenzie, Treasur/, from the Secretary for CoTiiraerce""and-Iad«stry —--
(SCI (in KNA. MCI 6/446). ? 
76. The largest Asian oil mills -in Uganda were those of the Madvhani group 
at Jinja. \ 
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is of a limited size, and unless we can sell entirely for export we 
77 
should -be shut down' . However after 1953, when Unilever installed new plan 
the problem was a different one when it came to competition with the 
Asian millers of oil. As we shall see, the construction of new plant at 
EAI by Unilever involved a high ratio of loan finance (mainly from the 
CDC) to assets, which naturally raised unit production costs in comparison 
to the Madvhani oil mills in Uganda which by the 1950's had paid off 
most of the debts on its capital equipment. (This was in addition to the 
lower wage costs at the Ugandan plant compared with EAI in Kenya). 
The dispute surrounding the supply of cotton seed oil from Uganda 
to the Kenyan oil plant at EAI developed into a test case between the two 
local administrations of Uganda and Kenya, both taking a 'nationalist 
of 
stance in defence/their own industries. Since the start of production by 
the EAI plant in the late 1940's, their products had experienced competition 
from the oil products of the Madhvani plant at Jinja in Uganda. Early in 
1956, the question arose as to which of these two main East African oil 
producers would secure a government contract to supply oils to the.Kenyan 
prisons department. Both companies submitted tenders. EAI tried to exert 
pressure on the Kenyan Ministry of Commerce and Industry who were indeed 
concerned to influence the tender board to accept the contract of the 
Kenya based firm. EAI's arguments in support of their case hinged on the 
* 
fact that they considered the Uganda product to be below government 
standards. In response to this pressure from EAI, the ministry of C & I 
urged the tender board that it was their duty to support 'local' 
industries where possible, providing they could produce a high standard 
product and'better services than the Ugandan firm. As the Asg. MCI pointed 
out ..'the terms must of course be competitive..but the wider implications 
of not patronising our own industries would appear' to merit the most serious i 78 consideration'. 
According to these 'competitive criterion' the firm of Muljibhai 
Madvhani won .the contract to supply vitimanised edible oils to the Prisons 
Department in Kenya in 1958. The 'Treasury explained to MCI that the 
77. Report on a visit made to Entebbe by officials of the Kenyan Ministry 
of Commerce and Industry to discuss with the Uganda Government the price 
of cake and cotton seed oil for 1950, (in KNA MCI- 6/242). j 
78. 'Memo to the Member for Commerce and Industry from the Assistant MCI, 
16.12.57, (in KNA MCI 6/446). 
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reason for the Ugandan firm gaining the tender was simply that of a lower 
price. On the question of quality the conclusion was ironic, a note 
from the Treasury outlined the main issue regarding standards, as 
regards quality there was not a lot in it, as both the samples submitted 
were below the required limit of 4000 international units per oz. of 
Vitamin A content. Hovever the samples offered by the Jinja firm still 
contained a higher numoer of vitamin units. It appears that the 
suggestion that the quality of the Uganda product was not so "nigh as 
that of Kenya is one that cannot be substantiated...' (sgn. Dv Dean 
79 
Treasury). In the case of quality, therefore, the local firm appears 
to have been more ccupetitive than the Unilever subsidiary. 
This was merely an exanple of a consistent state of competition 
which existed betwaen the Ugandan Asian firm and EAI during the 1950's. 
In 1957 the annual report of EAI stated that action was to be taken 
against Muljibhai Madvhani in Uganda as that company were infringing 
EAI/Unilever brand names; their margarine in the 'Cow' wrapper infringed 
the Blue Band design, their cooking fat 'Sun Brand' was a copy of Kimbo 
and their 'Champion Carbolic Soap' was a copy of 'Lifebuoy' soap. CI early 
the Ugandan firrr were manufacturing products of similar quality at a 
cheaper price, v'nich prompted action to prevent any further advantage 
80 
to the local firm by the use of Unilever brand, names. It was in order 
to compete for ihe lower income African market that EAI developed a brand 
of cheaper quality margarine in 1957 which' was put on the market in 1958. 
However, at this time the largest sales were of Kimbo and vegetable Ghee, 
for which cotton seed was used in the preparation, as the following 
table shovs: 
79. -.To MC: from D.V. Dean (Treasury), 5.2.58, (in KNA MCI 6/446). 
80.' "Directors Report, EAI 1958-1959, (in K M MCI 5/248). 
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Table 3. Net sales of EAI Products for 1957, (11 months) 
t» 
Kimbo ..£ 189,065 40% 
Veg. Ghee 105,005 22% 
Kim. Oil; 23,223 5% 
XR Oil 3.951 1% 
Vitaminised Oil 39,231 8% 
Margarine 108,750 23% 
Others 5,153 1% 
£474,380 100% 
(Source: Directors' Report of EAI, 1958, in KNA), 
The Tjgandag°vernment and the Kenyan government continued to 
support the firms in their respective territories. The Uganda govern-
ment continued to refuse to grant EAI any concessions on the bulk 
purchasing of Ugandan cotton seed for their oil plant. The Jinja 
Company was again at an advantage over EAI in -chat it was able to 
estimate the exact quantities of raw material required at a particular 
time whereas the Kenyan company was obliged to tender to the Ugandan 
government in advance, which meant they were not able to employ economy 
in the storing of raw materials. In fact from 1957 - 1959 EAI was 
compelled to reduce its price of vitamised oil and' margarine in order 
to compete with Madvhanivs products and also to increase the advertising 
allocation of these goods. The Uganda company therefore, remained with 
a competitive advantage over EAI until the early 1950's when EAI switched 
to palm oil instead of cotton seed as a raw material for the edible 
oils plant, (this oil was cheaper in price and had a higher fat content 
. N 31 than cotton seed oil). 
Since the 1960's the CDC have gradually been divesting themselves 
of their interest in EAI, for the purpose of getting industries off 
the ground 'the pilot schemes' have been completed and private capital 
new successfully controls the operation. However, the post-independence 
government was anxious to maintain a share in this large manufacturing 
81. This information was obtained from an interview with the Chairman 
Of EAI in June 1975. It would seem unlikely that the company will 
invest themselves in any sunflower growing project, as palm oil is 
cheap and has a high fat content. 
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company, and the CDC have since the early 1960!s sold some of their shares to 
the ICDC, so that at the present time (1976) Unilver hold 55% ICDC Investment 
Company 17% and the CDC 23%.EAI by 1974 had diversified their production into a 
number of other areas such as toothpaste and- fruit squash manufacture, as well 
as ths traditional soap arid oiIs}although the latter still account for the-. 
largest proportion of the Company's sales, the fats products account for about 
82 
60-70% of EAIi's turnover, and the remaining 30-40% are accounted for by soaps 
and detergents. The company also controls the largest share of the East African 
market in detergent, margarine and toilet soap, although in toothpaste they 
fall behind Colgate - Palmolive, the American firm. 
The aim here has been to examine the intervention of international 
finance capital in the form of the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC) which 
entered to support the East African Industries project and then to invite the 
participation of a British industrial capital. The CDC were mainly concerned 
with investing in agricultural projects in Kenya and elsewhere, and their 
function in this instance/well as in the case of industry was to stimulate 
83 the:British capital gooes industry. 
Table 4 Summary of EAI Balance Sheets 19$0-1973 
East African Industries 
Year of 1950 1950 1965 1970 1973 
formation . I.. ' 
Issue cj Capital 155 ,250 155,250 576,000 832,038 1,125.000 1,350,000 
Net/Assets 203,619 203,619 1,033,145 832,038 1,775,000 2,452,180 
Net Profit (1,100) (1,100) 171,581252,261 685,137 1,774,072 
/ : . 
Profitability (.5) (.5) i.g 3.1 3.8, ' 7.2 
(Source: Annual Reports of the Registrar General). / 
/ 
82. Interview, Ibid. 
83. In the case of EAI we have seen that not only was a British Industrial 
capital in the form of Unilever Ltd invited.by the CDC to undertaker-the project 
itself, but also a British firm, Mowleic Ltd. ,• was involved in all the construc-
tion work of the plant in the 1950's. 
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F. THE NATURE OF INDUSTRIAL GROWTH IN KENYA, 1945-1963. 
The post-war period was marked by a rapid move of capital into the 
manufacturing sector, and a concentration within that area.. In 1951, the 
value of the net product of manufacturing industry amounted to £10 million, 
which was approximately of the total net geographical product. For the 
first time, of the number of Africans in paid employment in Kenya in that 
/ " 84 year^ 42,000 or Iff/? were employed in the manufacturing industry. 
As has been pointed out earlier, the colonial administration was to make 
availible funds for the- stimulation of secondary industry, thus providing a 
supportive role to private capital entering the industrial sector. 
This higher level of support for m anufacturing enterprises was in marked 
contrast-,:to the pre-war period when certain colonial industries (such as 
textiles) were positively discouraged if they might compete with the British 
equivalents in British markets. After 1945, there was a general move towards 
import substitution by both foreign and local capital, and virtually all of the 
manufacturing concerns set up during'the 1950's were oriented towards the 
local market rather than the export market. Deliberate tariff protection in 
Kenya after 1958 was to stimulate the establishment of both local and foreign 
owned enterprises. 
The war period did generate a specific demand for particular 
consumer items which were in short supply due to transport problems.. These 
products included the manufacture of blankets, leather, shoes, soap, chemicals, 
85 
oils, textiles and glue. However, most of the these enterprises were quite 
transitory and as we have seen the East African Industrial management board 
that created the East African Industries complex was to dissolve as a 
government organisation and various parts of the enterprise were hived off 
to private; capital. The war time may have stimulated demand for locally 
produced manufactured goods, but the main impetus behind, the industrialisation 
process was to reach its peak in the mid and late 1950's. The largest 
84. . Paper by the,Member for Commerce and Industry, Hope-Jones on Industrial 
Development in Kenya, 
85. " ., War conditions had diverted much world production from the 
manufacture of consumer goods, and shipping problems which had cut off East 
Africa to a large extent from its traditional sources of supply, had shown 
the need for a greater measure of--self-sufficiency in East Africa. The post 
war political conditions and high taxation in some p-.rts of the world had 
caused capital to seek fresh outlets. Balance of payments difficulties had 
caused the Commonwealth to seek- new sterling sources of raw materials and 
manufactured goods ..." (Paper prepared for the E.A. Industrial Council, 
January 1956 by the Ministry of Commerce and Industry).. 
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proportion of this investment in the industrial sector between 1943 and 
19S3 was from abroad, mainly from Britain, although the growth.of Asian 
controlled enterprises was also significant during this'period. Before examin-
ing the.nature of foreign participation in this expansion of industrial concerns 
it is necessary to evaluate the emergence of a powerful Asian industrial" 
QS ' * class in East Africa from a historial perspective. 
i) Asian Capital: 
It has been shown elsewhere that the development of Asian, capital 
in East Africa before the Second War was confined.largely to the areas of 
trade and some basic processing of consumer items. The areas of accumulation 
for those of Indian origin in East Africa after the advent of British rule 
in Uganda and Kenya were confined to the areas of trade and commerce due to 
the restrictions placed by the early colonial state on land holdings by non-
European races. From the outset Asian capital was caught in between the forces 
cf setter." capitalism .and the state's 'protection* and supervision of indigenous 
capitalism. Asian merchant capital was to compete with both settler capital' 
for the control of trade in certain agricultural commodities and also with 
African merchant capital which, was by the 1930's in many areas (such as Nyeri 
district) challenging the hold of Asians over trade in commodities such as 
wattle bark. The pre-war colonial state in Kenya colony was largely to determine 
the role that Asian capital was to play. The question of access to land 
ostensibly remained open until the Crown Lands Ordinance of 1915 which 
empowered the Governor to veto land transations between races. In fact, 
before that time.several Indians had managed to buy land is so called 'white' 
designated areas, and in 1903 the Aga Khan was negotiating with Ugandan colonial 
officials for the introduction into East Africa of some agriculturalists from 
8? India, who could bring capital with them This was never to reach fruition, 
and the Indians were excluded on two counts from holding land in the white i 
highlands and in the reserves, although they were permitted to hold agricultural 
land, in the ' lowlands'- of Kenya-, which excluded all of the prime cultivable 
land. It was the juxtaposition between settler capitalism and indigenous 
capitalism that determined their role as traders "and low level manufacturers 
in East African before the; war.' During the Carter Report of 1932-1933 it 
36, This emphasis is -important when it comes to evaluating at present 
the possibilities of the emergence of an African- Industrial class, which 
is also a 'local' capital. 
37. " R.G. Gregory, India and East Africa, (Clarendon Press, Oxford 197l), 
p. 435. ' : " ~ 
0 
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was claimed that there was only one Indian agricultural settlement in 
Muhoroni, and the Indian representatives on the Commission along with the 
African members expressed deep disatisfaction with the existing land regulations 
and they asserted that the Europeans held too much land and cultivated only 
ll°/o of it, and they, advocated a heavy underdeveloped land tax to force 
83 • cultivation or sale.1" During the Commission, the Federation of Indian Chambers 
of Commerce of East Africa further complained that their trading operations 
were being restricted.by the Colonial government, in that under the Native 
Lands Trust Ordinance, trading centres which could be established within the 
reserves with the approval of the Local Native Council allowed the lease of 
plots of land which they considered were too small and the terms of such leases 
were further limited to 5 years. The Indian contingent on the basis.of these 
objections asked for the establishment of regular townships in the reserves, 
. . . . . . . . ;T)Q ; which were to gradually emerge after this date."" 
Thus, by the 1930's the Asian community was involved in a whole range 
of activities, from building to shoe making, but the main focus of their 
enterprise was in trading in commodities, and acting as the link between 
the African producer of goods such as cotton and the exporter of that commodity. 
In the early pre-second world war period there were many. Asians in clerical 
service of the colonial government, for instance in 1911 1,498 Indians were 90 . in the employ of the government. 
Before 1945, therefore, very few Asian merchants had ventured into 
manufacturing largely due to the constraints of capital and lack, of'credit 
facilities from European banks. There were a few exceptions to this 'rule: 
the Premchand Brothers set. up a factory to manufacture extract and a cotton 
ginnery, both in the 1930* s- in the Thika municipalityhaving been prevented 
from setting up their factory in the 'White Highland* areas,. Others were 
involved in small scale grain milling, sugar refining, and the manufacture of 
were „._„ 
aluminium hollow l; Most Asian merchants "in Kenya, before 194.5 were involved 
in highly competitive retail trade, and the restrictions•on their form of 
accumulation extended also to excluding them from importing- agencies as well 
as from farming. Before 1945, Asian merchants were not permitted to import 
88. 
. 89. 
90. 
Ibid,,p. 435. 
Ibip, P.436, 
Ibid, p. 113, 
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British manufactured goods directly, and they relied for their supplies 
of manufactured goods on the large British.based merchant houses in Kenya, 
91 -
such as Smith-MaCkenzie and Mitchell Cotts. This gave rise to a.situation 
whereby the Asian merchant class could only accumulate capital through an 
increasingly competitive form of retail trade, which in many cases, particularly, 
after the Second' War, provided the impetus towards some measure of import-
substituting manufacturing. Many groups of traders had before the war become 
involved in trading in one or two agricultural commodities, and after the war 
when importing was opened up on a larger scale to Asian merchants.some groups . such became involved in the importation of one commodity only/as cloth,.and in 
92 
this case they moved frequently into direct production of textiles. The 
Thika Cloth Mills set up by the Nath Brothers in the 1950*s was formed by 
a prominent group Of cloth traders. This became a typical.pattern, from 
importing the commodity into manufacture of the same items. 
During the 1950's, the rise in consumer demand in Kenya Colony, 
gave greatrimpetus to industrialisation whether it be foreign or local. The 
Asian class, as we have suggested earlier, had faced curtailment " of their 
spheres of accumulation before the war due largely to restrictions placed 
on them by the predominant settler class. After the Second War, the. administration 
did not represent so forcefully the interests of sections of the settler class 
and in general there were no restrictions placed on the progress of Asian 
industrial expansion into industry. However, it is interesting to note that 
as late as 1958, when the Premchand Brothers'took over the East African Match 
factory which was formerly set up by European fanners in the Kinangop area 
of the 'White Highlands'; they were prevented from operating there as it 
was a 'white* preserve, and they were forced tG dismantle the factory and 
93 
reconstruct it in Mombasa! ' This does not seerr to have been an unusual state 
of affairs i£ an Asian manufacturing enterprise in any way impinged upon 
areas of settler accumulation. Similarly in the late 1950's when Kenya 
91.- This information was gained from an interview with a director of 
Comcrafts Services Ltd.,.(formerly the Chandaria family) Mr. M. Premchand 
Chandaria in Nairobi 7/77. 
921 It is significant that, despite the large market for cloth within 
East Africa before 1945, the manufacture of this commodity was not permitted 
until the 1950's. This mainly to protect East African markets for British-
made textiles, although one speculate" that had cloth manufacturing been proposed 
by some Europeans, that the local administration in Kenya would hot have 
protected British interest in such a way. 
93. Details from the interview with M. P. Chandaria', op. cit. form of action 
by the administration, in support of sections of the settler class was clearly 
more common in the period before 1945, when all the small Asian manufacturing 
plants were compelled to set up in municipalities where they were permitted 
to purchase land, such as Mombasa, Thika, Nairobi, and Kisumu. 
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Aluminium Works (owned by.Bhagwangi and Premchand Brothers] wished to extend 
the. capacity of their subsidiary grain milling company in Mombasa, they were 
refused permission to do so by the Ministry of Agriculture who acted in response 
to pressure from the settler dominated KFA milling concern: Unga Ltd. This 
resulted in a court case by the Asians against the government, which was finally 
decided in the favour of the former,^ 
However, despite these setbacks it is clear that the level of accumulation 
of merchant capital by 1945 and the increase in markets for manufactured goods 
V 
after the Second War, was to stimulate a move by the larger elements of this 
group, into industry. The problem of credit was to be solved during this period 
and the role of Indian finance capital through the Banks of India and Baroda 
which set up after 1945 in Kenya became most important when it came to industrial 
investment. 
Asian Industrial Development after 1945: It has been indicated earlier that 
the post-war government policy of supporting industrialisation applied to. both 
local and foreign capital alike. Therefore the Asian enterprises that.wished 
to set up a manufacturing concern, after 1958 were given protective.tariffs 
against the imported item. In fact Eglin notes a strong correlation in the 
case of both foreign and local Indian capital between the institution of a 
95 
protective tariff and the establishment of an industrial concern. For instance 
under the 1958 revised tariff schedule, local industries were granted considerable 
protection. The following are all Asian owned enterprises: • 
The type of Asian industrial enterprises was similar to those 
- - S - I I - . - - • - • | , - — ' ' 
foreign investments made during the period, in that there emerged a highly 
concentrated structure of individual concerns, 'which involved the take over 
of many existing companies. This was the natural movement of capital, and was 
encouraged by the licencing legislation by the colonial government. Eglin 
argues that if it were not the existence of licencing legislation a more 
highly competitive structure of industries would have; emerged. • 
94* Interview with Chandaria, Ibid. 
94a. This connection between East Africa and, European countries and Asian 
merchants in Kenya enhanced the interventions of finance capital as credits, 
were built up by the later, which were later used to provide capital for 
their extension into manufacturing,' / 
95.'. Ibid, p. 7. 
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TABLE 5 
Product 
Pasta 
Matches 
Pressure 
Stoves 
Company 
House' of ManjI 
East African Match 
Co 
Kenya Aluminium 
Works 
Protective Duties DUTY 
Yr. est or began. 
Production 
1958 
' 1958 
Cotton Wool African Cotton Inds-
Corrugated 
Aluminium Mabati Ltd. 
Sheets 
Tomato Puree Kabazi Canners 
Galvanised, Plain, Corrugated 
& Enammelled metal sheets 
1953 
.1961 
1961 
1958 
1963 
Imposed 
8/25 per 
gross boxes 
22°/o 
2S&& 
3CP/o 
23k 
Yr. 
1958 
1953 
1958 
1963 
1961 
1960 
1964 
Previous 
Free 
3/30 per 
gross box 
Free 
Free 
Free 
Free' 
12^ . 
(Source: Kenya Customs Tariff Schedules, in Eglin, op.cit., p. 14). 
Immediately after the war from 1945-1950,"a Ministry of Commerce and industry 
list of products and manufactures illustrates the wide range of concerns in 
which Asian firms were involved which include woodwork, engineering, building 
materials, bakeries etc. However, by the mid 1960® s. a higher degree of 
concentration had emerged and the control of the largest portions of Asian 
manufacturing lay in the hands of a few large conglomerates. 
• . These large scale Asian industrial groups jbsed take-overs to 
consolidate their hold over particular branches of'production, a tactic used 
by most capitalist enterprises at a certain stage of concentration. One of 
the most significant Asian industrial groups to emerge in the 1950's was 
that of the Chandaria family. At the present time this group have 14 industrial 
concerns in Kenya, with enterprises ranging from wire to stationery manufacture. 
This process be investment in industry began in the 1950's. Before the war, 
the family had been concerned with importing and exporting commodities. 
The Kenya Aluminium Works, an aluminium holloware factory originally formed 
in 1929 by another Indian group, was taken over by the Chandaria's in 1954. 
This company was to act as a holding company for their further acquistions 
and investments in industrial enterprises. A subsidiary of this firm, 
Kaluworks, which had also been taken from some other Asian industrialists, 
managed.to set up the first..steel rolling mills in Kenya which began production 
in 1963. This firm continued to monopolise production until foreign firms 
were to erect several competing plants in the late 1960*s. In a similar 
fashion the group bought the East African Match Company in the late 1950's 
from its European owners. The Chandaries bought a 5CF/= share in this company 
in 1960 which they later increased to 75y'; with the Khimasia family holding the 
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remaining Using the Kenya Aluminium Works Company as their base, the 
Chandaria's also invested in new plant. In 1958 they set up a new factory 
to manufacture nails, the East African Wire Industries Ltd.,which along with 
the purchase of Kaluworks served to give the group a monopoly in this field c;g Which . 
of production."' Just as foreign firms/operate in the.same environment, 
this group used collusion to prevent price competition. The Chandaria * empire' 
in Kenya expanded rapidly in the 1960*s and its industrial investments were 
served by a large marketing net work. 
The Khimasia family made similar moves from trade into import-
substituting industrial concerns after the Second World War< These Asian 
industrialists had been involved in virtually all the cases in trading in 
the commodities which they ultimately manufactured themselves. In 1958 they 
established a factory to manufacture fruit squashes, mineral waters, jams and 
jellies, which began their move into food and drink manufacture, the products 
of which were marketed by their existing organisation. Before 1956 the 
group had largely.been involved in the import trade, chiefly in the areas 
of food and cloth. This direct move into production from trade was evident 
also in the setting up of the Thika Cloth Mills (Nath Brothers).in 1959 to 
manufacture cotton and silk linings .for the East African market. In 1967 
the group further consolidated its interests in the area of food production, 
by taking over Gibson and Company, an European owned firm which controlled 
Kabazi Canners which manufactured a wide variety of canned fruits, vegetables 
and concentrates, This hold over one of the most important food processing 
factories in Kenya did not, however, remain impervious to the thrust of 
international capital. In 1970 BSBQfc^ -Bond, Leib'ig, in one of its moves to 
diversify away from tea production, bpughV 3Cf/o shareholding in this company, 
and they at present control the marketing of Kabazi Canners products. Out 
of a total of all companies owned by the Khimasia'$.6 are industrial concerns 
• , 97 and the rest are marketing and wholesaling agencies. 
Probably the largest Asian industrial.complex in East Africa as 
a whole (Uganda, and Kenya) was that of the Madvhani group." Unlike the 
Asian capital based in Kenya, the Madvhani group used agricultural production 
. " . . 1 ' " i ':•••''• ' 1 
96. This information was derived from the Annual Returns of the Registrar 
General for these firms. 
97. Ibid. 
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and the processing of primary products as the basis for its accumulation. 
The Madvhani empire in Uganda was based on sugar cultivation, processing 
cotton.ginneries and oil mills, all of which/established in the 1940*s and 
1950's. From the profits generated from the sugar mills,, the group diversified 
into Steal Rolling Mills, textiles, and glass manufacture by the 1930's. 
These moves into manufacturing in Uganda were a logical step to distribute 
manufactured goods under protected conditions - the family had been involved 
in wholesale trading and sugar processing before the Second War, The profits 
on importing goods were diminishing rather than expanding, therefore it was 
a distinct advantage to actually produce the goods within the country. 
Exactly the same mechanism applied when it came to their extension into Kenya 
during the 1950'-s 
From 1955 onwards, Madvhani manufactured products had been marketed 
in Kenya through Muljibhai Madvhani Ltd, which has trading branches in Nairobi, 
Mombasa and Kisumu. The Madvhani group took the opportunity to extend.their 
industrial production into Kenya during the 1960*s in order to preserve their 
markets for industrial products. The group used the method.of takeover, as 
did many foreign firms to expand their industrial empire in Kenya. Most of 
the companies which the group purchased during the 1960's were in the hands 
of the receiver ana an agreement was reached between the company and the 
Kenya Government that the latter would grant first option to the Madvhani 
'group for the purchase of industrial firms that.had been declared bankrupt gg 
in Kenya. The Kenya Glassworks, for instance, were taken over by the 
Madvhani•s in 1955 from the Asians who had set up the company in 1947 in order 
:-.-,;- were • • to preserve their market for.glass products which/under pressure from, imported 
products and local producers. (in 1974, this company was. estimated, to control 
70;' of the Kenyan market For glass bottles). The Kenya Rayon Mills in 1965 
was also in the hands of the receiver, having been formerly owned, by Europeans, 
and in 1965 the Madvhani's took over this factory which corresponded with 
their Ugandan textile production. Similarly, the Associated Sugar Company 
98. They were not restricted in Uganda from holding land in the same 
way as the Kenyan Indians were, due to the lack of a settler presence in the 
former-territory.. In fact, the'administration in Uganda seems to have strongly 
endpuraged import-substituting manufacture particularly in the case of basic 
consumer items such as oil and sugar even before the Second War, 
\ 
99, > This information was obtained during an interview with the former 
Company Secretary and a Director" Of "the Madvha'nx group in Uganda and Kenya 
on 2/5/75., . .. ...... .. . : 
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in Kenya was formed in 1965 to take over the assetts /°the former Kenya Sugar 
company, which was again in the hands of the cf'icial receiver in that year. 
This enterprise also fitted.in with their predominant sugar processing interests 
in Uganda, In 1955, also the Madvhani group -were able to buy a majority 
shareholding (60$) in the Kenya.Towel--Manufacturers, who were indebted to the 
Kenya Rayon Mills, thus the group were able to "urther extend their interests 2_QQ 
in textile production in Kenya." 
The Emco Steel Works "was the only nev plant that the group invested 
in during the 1960's. The demand for steel ir East Africa was such that 
either'the Madvhani[s had to expand their Steel tube manufacturing plant in 
Uganda or establish another factory elsewhere. There was clearly an advantage 
in setting "up a plant in Kenya with import protection, and in 1968 they <-
establish another factory elsewhere. There was clearly an advantage in 
setting up a plant in Kenya with import protection, and in 1968 they established 
a. steel plant at Ruarakc about 10 miles from Nairobi. This plant supplies 
the local"market with steel bars,sheets, tubes, etc?which are manufactured 
from local steel scrap. This' company in 1974 supplied 7CF/o of the steel 
requirements of Kenya, The chief marketing company for the Madvhani 
manufactured items in Kenya is Kemulco Ltd, which represents an.alliance 
between the:Asian industrialists and the indigenous bourgeoisie , and provides 
ah umbrella of political protection for the ground investments in Kenya. 
However, the Madvhani group of companies,"" (having been expelled from Uganda 
during the Asian exodus of 1971J remain static in Kenya and their chief aim 
at present, is to gradually divest themselves of the Kenyan ivestments and 
102 
transfer the capital out of the ccuntry. The Chandaria group have already 
transfered'the control of their companies in Kenya to holding companies 
which are registered in tax havens such as Bermuda and the Channell Islands. 
It becomes evident that the potential recognised by writers such 
as Colin Leys of • Asian industrialists becoming an 'industrial bourgeoisie' 
of a classical Marxist type :was not to be realised.c Clearly, however, the 
'empires' which have been considered here of the Chandarias1, Madvhanis' 
and Khimasiai, were not insubstantial. The tot?l value of the Madvhani's 
100. 
.above,. 
101,. 
102, 
Return'- of the Registrar General for Madvhani firms and interview 
The Kenyan partners were the Chairman of Lonrho and his ridther. 
Interview with company secretary, op.cit. 
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fixed assets in Kenya and Uganda in 1972 was estimated to be about £40 million. 
I would estimate that the asset value of the Chandaria investments in Kenya-
would be a little less than that of the Madvhani1s-somewhere between 
£15-£20 million. The reasons for the failure of this.class to fulfil this 
potential development into a 'local.1 bourgeoisie class are to be found in 
the historical position of Asian capital, during the colonial era, which has 
been outlined above. Indians in Kenya were never able to control political 
power either under the colonial or post-coloninl regime to support their 
accumulation of productive capital, and therefore never transcended the level 
of being directly involved in their production (in terms of the management 
of their eterprises) with the ownership structures being tied to families 
rather than groups of capitalists. This applies especially in the Kenyan 
context where Asian capital was.caught in between the other capitals operating 
in the solonial state: foreign, settler and indigenous. This contradiction 
was not resolved in the post-colonial era when the full forces of indigenous 
capitalism were supported by the stete, to the exclusion of Asian capital. 
So far Asian merchant capital has felt the squeeze of Africanisation pressures 
and the movement of sections of the bourgeoisie into trade formerly controlled 
by Indians has been quite rapid since 1971. However, although the industrial 
capital controlled by Indians is still quite secure from takeover-the Asians' 
lack of political power has suppressed any moves towards expansion o^ industrial 
enterprises, and most of the large groups of industrialists are endeavouring 
to establish themselves as some form of 'multinational* capital attached to 
no national boundary. The Chandaria family, for instance, have not only managed 
to transfer all their equity out of Kenya, but they have ^ Isc set up industrial 
plants in Ethiopia. This applies to the large groups of Asian industrialists 
rather than the small scale manufacturers who might tend to remain in Kenya 
for a longer period of time, although for the same reasons their capital 
• reproduction would be restricted, and they are likely ultimately • to become 
susceptible to takeover by indigenous capital. 
ii) Foreign Capital in Industry 
It has been noted that a highly concentrated structure of industrial 
enterprises emerged from'the 1950's onwards with an increasing trend towards 
•oligopoly. Some large companies with established marketing interest in '"East 
103. This point is illustrated by the family base of most Asian industrial 
groups which does not tend to perpetuate itself after the death of demise of 
the family. A national bourgeoisie is ultimately not tied to such a narrow 
mode of operation. 
104. For further details of the activities of the Asian 'multinational 
corporations' see Robin Hurry, on The Chandsrias, (mimeo, IDS, Sussex, 1975). 
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Africa did manage to create almost monopoly conditions in that market, such 
as the case of British American Tobacco which set. up a. manufacturing plant in 
Kenya .in 1957, Although, during, the 1950's part of the move towards import-
substitution involved a number of firms establishing manufacturing plants 
in the same commodity which meant a hot competition for the local market-, 
the most notable examples in this group are the oases of csment and paint. 
It has been noted by Eglin and others that this kind.of 'retaliatory* investment 
in some industrial sectors in order to preserve various 'slices' of the market, 
has given rise to an excess capacity in industry as a whole. This has probably 
been countered by the increase in demand for manufactured goods in the 1960's, 
although duplications of plants within East Africa have certainly resulted in 
cases of'excess capacity, one can recall the case of the setting up of the 
General Tyre. Plant in Tanzania and Firestone Tyres in Kenya .Within the space 
of two years. The present plans for establishment of vehicle assembly plants 
exhibit the same tendency'towards the provision of excess capacity within 
a not infinitely expanding market. This duplication of plants in the.l96Q's 
has Mled to the move to develop export markets, cement/aSgo§d example. By 
the: early 1960*s the capacity of the cement industry had overtaken demand 
in East Africa due to the establishment of three cement plants in the area, 
two in Kenya and one in Uganda. 
The significant distiction between the pattern of fbreign investment 
in manufacturing enterprises before and after the war, was the move into non-
agricultural manufacturing, (see Table 7 for the major foreign investments 
in the industrial.sector between 1945 and 1963), There-was a general move 
of British industrial capital into productive enterprises in the colonies, 
the reasons for which have been already outlined. Therefore, after the war, 
many British industrial firms wished to. .establish plants in the colonies in 
order to control .markets for their products which were previously imported. 
This /r ,....:; . 
•included oil refining., cement processing, paint and varnish 
manufacture,wooden, brushes and household equipment, metal containers, roofing 
.felts, and so on, (See table 7)., Foreign' investment'in the food and drink manufacturing sector also 
increased' rapidly during this period, and on a .larger scale than during the 
106 inter-war years, due to the expansion of consumer demand after the war. 
105, Eglin, bp,cit., p.lo. 
106. Post - War there was an enhanced level of spending power amongst 
Africans due to several factors; the war period...had introduced money incomes to 
many in the armed, services. There, was a rapid rise in money wages in the 
period between 1945'amd 1954'(according to M.P, Cowen 'Real Wages in Central 
Kenya', mimeo, 1975, Nairobi.) 
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In general there was a concentration of a few firms within each sector, 
rather than a proliferation, a pattern which was encouraged by the industrial 
licencing legislation after 1958. Rarely were there more than 4 or 5 
foreign producers in each field, with the exeption of the textile industry . 
'The East African Industries subsidiary of Unilever was to establish during 
the 1950's, a'predominant hold over the fats, soap and detergent market, 
which has lasted to the present. 
During the 1950's the ..two Kenyan cement, plants were brought under 
the ownership of a dominant world cement manufacturer, Associated Portland 
Cement, which was to set up a subsidiary in 1957 in Tanzania. Another company 
with a monopoly hold over the East African market established in the late 
1950's was Shell-3P. in the oil industry. In 1953 an oil refinery was ^ constructed 
by. the Shell-Bp company at Kenya's port of Mombasa at a cost of between £20 
, and £50 million and the installation was designed to cater for the entire 
oil demand of East Africa. By. .1964 the .plant was. scheduled to-be producing 
2,000,000 tons of crude per year. This was a way of securing a protected 
market, as imported.fuel held .a tariff, and the other oil companies reached 
an agreement whereby they all took an eouity share of the company. These 
other oil marketing companies included Caltex, BP, Esso and Shell. Shell-BP 
remained with the largest share in the East African Oil Refineries until 
1970 when the government took a 50}o portion of the East African Oil Company as 
part of their nationalisation drive for basic industries. However, due to 
the origional establishment of BP-Shell's hegemony over the oil processing 
plant as 1975; this firm still controls just over 50$ Qf oil sales in East 
Africa.107 * 
Metal Box and Van Leer containers divided up the Metal containers 
'market from 1949 when they established production plants in Kenya. 
Van Leer containers provided cans and containers of a heavy duty nature 
such as paints, chemicals, etc., while Metal Box was specifically aimed at 
providing metal cans for the rapidly expanding fruit and vegetable processing 
industry. It is clear that where a proliferation of plants:occured as in the 
case of the paint and cement industry-, the reasons for the formation of 
several plants producing the same product lay in the international state of 
competition within that industry. In both those cases this led to excess 
capacity for a period of about 5 years after the plants had been established. 
The Unilever controlled East African Industries after 1954 until the present 
107. This information is from the Oil.Industry file in the EAS newspaper 
cutting library. 
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asd 
has maintained a dominant held over ±he Kenyan market in fats, although its 
portion of the soap market dropped with the advent of various other foreign 
soap manufacturers such as Colgate Palmolive and Cussons in the 1950*s. 
The East African Industries plant had the advantage of starting the first 
large scale production of hydrogenation products during the war and soap from 
1956, although these products were not heavily assisted by government 
protection at this point. (EAI received a suspended duty of 75 cts. per 
lb weight" in 1955 for its imported inputs, to support its investment in the 
hydrogenation plant). 
However, we have stressed that after 1958 the government, adopted 
a specifically protective policy towards investment in industry which assisted 
both local and.' foreign capital alike. This assistance stimulated foreign 
investment in the"same Way as the Asian enterprises examined in Table 5. "Table 6 
..illustrates the correlation: between the duty established and the foreign 
investment, after 1958 to the present: although this trend is more pronounced 
after 1962. This government action was clearly in response to pressure 
from foreign investors, although.we have seen-in that individual cases such 
as cement, the government provided support through import protection on an 
ad hoc basis,/" concession being considered a pre-requisite for the 
establishment of new plant by most foreign investors. 
This pattern of import-substituting industrialisation during the 
1950's reflected quite a high degree of concentration of production among 
a few firms. However, the foreign firms investing, in manufacturing in the 
1950's tended to invest directly in production to preserve their share of 
the market for that product, and this competition on occasion resulted in 
several different foreign firms establishing similar plants when the market 
was not yet large enough to absorb that production. In some cases this 
•has continued to the present even given the expansion of demand in the East 
•--.•- • 10P African, market for manufactured items. . 
The participation of Asian capital in the industrial sector has 
been considerable, and thei: stimulus behind their entry into this area in 
the late 1950's took a similar form to that of foreign capital. Competition 
from other importers of various manufactured goods encouraged the move into 
direct production from wholesale trading.. . The East African Administration 
103. The tyre industry is a good example, of this mechanism. The Firestone 
Plant was established in 1970 within -Qmorrbks of;the establishment, of General 
Tyres plant in Tanzania. Firestone, due to various factors, (including the 
continued illegal importation of other brands of tyres,) has never operated 
at full capacity. 
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from a 'nationalist' perspective, even before Independence, sought to develop 
a local industrial sector to provide for the needs of the local market, and 
they were therefore prepared to offer support to both foreign and local 
capital alike by way of tariff protection and in some cases licencing. 
During the 1950's, foreign investment in the manufacturing sector was certainly ......... ]_QQ 
on a larger scale than local Asian enterprises. w By the .1960's, Asian 
industrial capital became more concentrated and a number of smaller Asian 
enterprises were absorbed.by the larger conglomerate groups such as the 
Chandarias and Madvhani's. 
In order to illustrate in more detail the mechanisms of competition 
and subsequent concentration in the Kenyan manufacturing sector there will 
follow two cases studies on one food manufacturing enterprise and one non-
food manufacturing concern - pineapples and cement respoctively. 
TABLE 6. .-'• ' Tariff Protection 1958-1962 
Product . Company Yr. established DUTY 
or began production Imposed Yr. Prevous 
Industrial Ink Coates Bros 1960 22$ 1958 11$ 
(EA) 
Bicycle Inner •Beta Shoes • 1958 90 cts 1958 55 bts P. lb. tubes . 7 •••• per lb. 
Bicycle inner Avon Tyre 1958 90 cts 
tubes •• Remoulding per lb. 
Paints Sadolins 1959 25$ 1961 11$ 
Leyland Paint 
Company .1958 335$ 1963 : 
E.A. Paints 1960 
WalpamUr 1961 
Vehicle Tyres Michelin (Tanz) 1962 S.l/25 p. lb' 1962 90 cts P. lb. G1 Tyre (Tanz) 1969 S,1/50 p. lb,19S8 90 cts P. lb. Firestone 1969 S.l/50 p. lb 1968 90 cts P. lb. 
(Source: Kenya Customs Tariff Schedules 
Kenya Directory of Industries 1974., 
in Eglin op.cit p.6.) 
109. Sec Lhe Survey of Industrial Production of 1967 for citizen and 
non-citizen interest in each manufacturing sector- in Kenya. This shows the 
heavy concentration of foreign based firms in the major industrial sectors 
of the economy.,, while the local' equity remains mainly in the food and drink 
processing sector, (many, of these firms are Asian owned).' 
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Table 7. Ma.ior Foreign Investments between 1945^1953. 
COMPANY •••—• Owned by: 
BSverage 
1. Food & Products Date Product. ' ' ' ' 
np 
np , 
Bata Shoe Company .1940 
Schweppes (EA). Ltd.1954 
Shoes and bicycle inners 
Sode Drinks 
Bata (Canada) 
Allsops & Schweppes (UK) 
ext 
np 
Allsops East Africa Pepsi Cola 
1954 
1953 
Beer 
Soda Drinks 
Allsops 
Pepsi Cola Inc. (USA) 
np Fitzgerald Baynes 1953 Soda"Drinks Canada Dry Ltd. (UK) 
np 7-Up Bottling CO. 1954 Soda Drinks 7—Up Company (USA) 
np Kenya Canners •1950 Canned fruits 5 
vegetable 
(1) Pickering & West (UK) 
(2) Delmonte'Inc. (USA 
in 195c). 
to ; Associated Packers 1956 Fruit squashes, pudd-
ings juices, jellies 
Mitchell Cotts (UK) 
to 
to 
ABC Foods 
Lyons Maid 
1954 
1959 
Animal feeds 
Ice Cream 
Baumam E- Do. 
Lyons (UK) 
np Coca Cola Mid 
Africa 
1956 Soft soda drinks Gtoce Cola (USA) 
np E.A. Tobacco 1954 Manf. tobacco & 
cigarettes 
British American 
Tobacco 
to Kenya Orchards 1948 canned fruit & 
vegetables 
Marshalls Ltd. (UK) 
ext. E.A. Breweries 1952 bear Ind C-oope (UK) 
2. Non-Food Manufacturincr, 
np Robbialac Paints 1956 paints and varnishes Robbialac (UK) 
np Leyland Paints 
EA. 
1954 paints and varnishes Baumanr.- and Co, 
5 Leyland Paints, (UK) 
np Cassmann Brown 1953 footing felts Cassmann (UK) 
np Sadalins- Paints 1959 paints & 'varnishes Sadolins 
np 
np 
East African Oxygen 
Bamburi Portland 
Cement 
1949 
1953 
oxygen 
cement 
British Oxygen 
Amalgamated Roadstone 
Corpn (UK) 
Cementia Holdings AG 
ext EA Portland Cement 1956 cement Associated Portland 
Cement 
Avon Tyre Remould-
ing Company 
1958 bicycle inner tube Avon Tyres.fUK) 
ext Bata Shoe Company 19©-
58 
bicycle inner tube 
leather and shoes . 
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Company 
np E. African Stationery 1949 
Manufacturers 
np -Metal Box EA . 1948 
np Crown Cork Co. EA. 1948 
np Van Leer * 1952 
Containers EA. 
.no Shell Chemical 
np Sterling Winthrop 
np Finlay Industries Ltd 
• -; 1952 
np , E.African Oil Re- 1959 
finery 
np Walpamur EA Ltd. 1961 
Product 
Stationery 
Metal container ~-
Seals 
Steel drums, pails 
Owned By; 
Dickinson Co. (UK) 
• Metal- Box LK Ltd. 
Crown Seals Ltd. UK 
Van Leer Containers 
(Holland) 
Chemicals 
brushes, wooden articles 
Sterling Winthrop 
(USA) 
James Finlay Ltd. 
(Scotland, UK) 
refining of crude oil Shell-BP Ltd (LK) 
paints and varnishes Walpamur UK. 
NOTES; | 
ext - Extension of existing plant, 
to - Takeover of existing firm, 
np - Formation tif new plant. 
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O^ TpVTT CTHR1 FT JT^ .tta 
This study id.ll provide a more det .iled example of- the relationship 
between the local colonial state and foreign capital aid how this effected 
the ultimate concentration within the industry. The increased willingness 
of the state to provide support to private capital entering industry has 
been stressed before, in the context of the changing emphasis of colonial 
'development* policy. This study 011 the establishment of a cement industry 
in Kenya by foreign capital id.ll focus primarily on the pressure exerted by 
the foreign company on the local Kenyan administration to grant concession's 
in order to cushion the 'infant industry' which would in effect, serve to 
protect the potential cement industry from competition. The degree of success 
of these moves by the foreign company will be assessed in the light of the 
local, state's extended capacity for infrastructure provision in the post-war 
period» 
: . -i' • 
t 1 
1) The Bamburi .Portland Cement Company; 
Cement is an example of a."'commodity where 'a measure of impert substitution 
wasj necessary as far back -as the 19305a, when the British product was experiencing 
severe competition with imported Japanese cement in last African markets, 
partial processing of cement had begun in 1933 with the formation of the last 
African Portland Cement Company rhich set up a factory in Nairobi to grin.-' cement 
from imported clinker. This company formed 13 a partnership between the three 
main cement- distributors in last Africa, Baumann, Smith Mackenzie the African 
'-Mercantile Marine Company, (20v) with the two British cement suppliers - Tunnel! 
Cement Holding 40? and Associated Portland Cement holding •mother Mhen 
t'he East'African Portland Cement Company sot up the clinker mill in the 1930'n 
and the British Standard Portland Cement Company in the 1950 's established % 
full cement processing plant at Bamburi, the chief aim in the case of the latter 
had. been to supply the local last .African markets whereas' by the 1970's local 
sales formed only half the Bamburi plant's cement production. Me will trace the 
development of this industry which was firstly aimed at serving the local market 
and later expanded into m export industry. 
j 
Until the Second "fori"" 'Jar in last Africa the cement consumption of the 
area clearly did not justify the expenditure on , complete cement plant, (see 
table S), despite the fact that the Kenyfc. coast was ideally suited for •.•.." 
.Informtion'rfron the. Annual Rotairhs of the" legistr^r-General for the last 
African Portland Cement Company.' 
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such in enterprise with its abundant source of limestone. In fact, the Fast 
.African Portland. Cement company had clearly toyed with the idea of constructing 
d full cement processing plant on the coast, and just before the war this 
company had. even purchased a stretch of lane, south of "Jombasa island. The main 
obstacle, however, to any cement firm wanting to set up a large production pi ant 
in Kenya before the war, was the consistent refusal of the government of the 
territory to protect the "infant industry5 against dumping of cement from 
abroad. 
An East African Standard Report in September 1951 on the cement industry in 
Kenya commented that,3...... a considerable number of years ago other deposits 
on the coast, from which it was proposed to develop for cement liinufacture were 
sterilised because the British government would not give the promoters of the 
scheme any protection against the conxoetition of dumping of Japanese cement'."^" 
Clearly, during the post-war era large fereigri-based. industrial firms had. * • 
a greater degree of success than before in extracting concessions from the local 
administration with regard, to the protection of the colony's industries. As we 
hove discovered in the .analysis of British 'development' policy towards the 
colonies, the local administration were both able -and willing to provide a more 
comprehensive range of infrastructure and protective provisions for new industries. 
The success of the cement plant established at the coast in 1952 must be contrasted 
with the failure of the origional cement grinding company; East African Portland 
Cement Company to obtain any reasonable concessions from the pre-war administration, 
particularly with regard to the dumping of cheap imported cement on the internal 
market. 
The plant to manufacture cement which was set up at Famburi between 1951 
and 1952, was >. partnership between two foreign based firms, with the minority 
participation of a local capitalist, John Hughes. Cementia Holdings A.G., was 
an old established Swiss firm of cement manufacturers which had lost many of 
its factories in Europe by the end. of the Second "Jorld 'far. Therefore, after 
\ 
the war, this firm wanted to establish production •reas outside of Furope, and 
by 1949 they were considering three different countries for cement production? 
Ireland, Australia and Kenya. Dr. Felix ?Tondl, the Managing Director of the 
Swiss firm, after conducting extensive feasibility studies on each potential -area, 
111. limestone is. the basic raw material for grinding into cement. 
112c FAS 6.9.51, (in KNA '5CI 6/457). 
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estimated that the production costs would be lower in Kenya than the other 
alternative .or ass, and he estimated tfa it the establishment of a cement plant 
on the Kenyan coast would cost approximately £600,000. ^ Gementia procured, 
a British partner, (which was import ant when it came to dealing adth the 
Kenyan administration). The Amalgom-itGd loadstone Corporation was a company 
involved primarily in cuarrying, and they also wonted to diversify their interest' 
, , . 114 and procaictxon areas. 
From the outset of this proposed cement plant, the Kenyan idministration 
gave the utmost encouragement to the company. Dr. a&ndl, who w.as the engineer 
concerned with the construction of the plait, had chosen Kenya in preference to 
other reas for several reasons: the unlimited supply of limestone from the 
coral coast, and its proximity to the port -and the good infrastructoral facilities 
available (power supplies, water, engineering facilities etc.) 
The government were enthusiastic enough to make excellent provisions for 
such services to be made available to the company. Apart from the obvious 
motivation of developing second :,ry industries in the colony, the local 
administration immediately JTter the war had been under pressure from powerful 
sections of the "njuropean class • * . .'.•_'• -a:- - ' concerned about the 
1 "J c 
•cost of living,' to remedy the serious shortage of cement in the colony'. 
The cement -grinding nri.ll of the Kast African Portl and Cement Comp-uiy in U-.iirobi 
was insufficient to supply the quickly oxp.inding post war demand for cement, 
(cement consumption had expanded, from 25,000 ton.:: in 1945 to 123,000 tons in 
1950). Cement imports from Japan had been '•"isrupted by the war, -and even 
supplies from 73ritish manuf acturers rfc the time were not enough to meet the 
booming demand. During 1951 in the Legislative Committee (L10C0) there was 1 
b arr Age of questions put to the department of Tr ».de and Supplies about the 
inadequate supply of cement in the colony and the high price of the imported 
commodity, which, it was Alleged was .aversely affecting the cost of living. 
A comment from the chairman of the Kenya Association of building and Civil 
engineering Contractors in the J?.ast African 'it^ jy' rd (16.7.51) outlined another 
position, Moae of Kenya's leading firm" of contractors may cease operation 
113. Prom the Aritish Ct and. rd Portland Cement ComD=iny to the Amalgam ated 
loadstone Corporation UK, 1-/51, (in KAa T-I 6/457). 
114. The son of air Charles Aarkh .mr who was a prominent Kenyan settler at 
the time, had an interest in the thar-aholding of the .Iraalgam vbed loadstone 
Corpor ation and he acted as' the medi ator between amalgamated an'" the Twi^s firm 
of Cementia Holdings Lid., (in memo from dept. of Lands to Hon. Chief Secret ry, 
Nairobi, in "iCI 6/V57). 
115. In October 1951 Ar. n. Cooke (Coast representative in L-C-CO), put .forward 
a motion ruestioning the government's handling of the Colony's cost of living, 
(in K/iS auiO.51). 
ir* A ? ::?5 
to save their dwindling capital if sir plies of cement are not made available 
in the right places ait the right time.r 
Thus, in addition to n theoretic 1 commitment towards encouraging 
industries in tho colony after the war, the Kenyan administration had. the 
further motive of wishing to placate various segments of the settlor class, 
both the large contractor.s and tho white petit-bourgeoisie for whom the 'coat 
of living* problem was acute at that time, Piratly tho company were granted 
generous terms for the lease of land on which to establish the plant. The 
government graated the company a 99 year lease for 7*50 acres of land on the 
north mainland, coast at Bamburi at a rent for excavation sites of £3 per ere 
17 
and £15 per acre for residential sites. " ' 'Liter and power were extended to 
the plant from Mombasa by the administration. Royalties were to be on a 
sliding scale and .affected the first 50, COO tons per annum that the company 
produced, after that time they were to be nominal. 0 'Then the bill was passed 
through LBGGC in 1951 > (to authorise the manufacture of cement at Pamburi), 
the administration' over-rode the opposition from the Bamburi residents 
Association, -and .adopted . law to protect the company from being sued, by the 
residents for 'noise or other nuisance5. •• report or. the debate summarised 
the main issued, '..The government made v liable the arc: where the principle 
ingredients were known to exist and gare encouragement to the project. There 
has been some opposition, not unnatur -ily from property owners in wh at is -a 
beauty spot..from the Colonies' point of view, the very substantial output 
will, make an import-oat contribution to the supplies of one of the basic 
commodities of 11 modern states, and reduce the dependence on imports in 11° time of peace and in time of emergency5. 
The most important concession to be extracted, from the government by 
the comp.aay was that anti-dumping legislation should be enacted immediately , 
the factory want into production, and in October 1955 the legislation against y 
dumping was finally passed. (Although tho Pamburi Plant actually went into f" 
production e.rlier than expected, in 1953)» The administration imposed „. 
% ' V ' ' 
116. BAS 16.7.51. 
117. Prom the DsiJt. of Lands to tho Hon. Chief Secretarv, Nairobi, 
April 1950, '''(in Id' '151 6/457). .. 1 
11C. Por instance per 1,000 cubic feet for a tonnage over 50,000 tons p.a. 
the rate war? only -5/-. 
119. TAP 6.9.51, A. Cement Ind^try. 
a duty on imported cement of ?4/— per 10 tons,which added to the already higher 
price of -the imported.equivalent with 'freight charges, was sufficient to protect 
the local product.10 
\s part of the ~origiqn~l agreement between the company and the local 
administration it had been concluded that the government should construct a 
branch railway line connecting the plant (10 miles north of Mombasa) with the 
portheado However, this commitment was never honoured due to the diversion of 
government funds to deal with the Emergency from 1952-1955? on the question 
of the bridge... in the next planning period it is hoped to provide funds for 
this construction project. It will, however$ be appreciated that priorities must 
be dependent on the position in regard, to the Emergency and the funds available..* 
The government would have had to construct firstly a bridge amd then.a connecting 
railway line under the origional agreement, which the company'felt was not their 
responsibility. In 1955 the managing director of the British Standard -.Portland 
Cement Company at Baraburi in a list of recuests for government assistance, made 
the following comment on the necessity for the construction of a branch line:' 
'..Me can manage oUite well the road transport for our present outout, soon to 
reach 100,000 tons per annum, but we must anticipate transport difficulties, 
1 r^ A 
: should this outout be increased to say, 5-00,000 tons p.a. * However.,' due to 
the heavy expense of contructing both i bridge and railway, the company have 
not invested in such an enterprise, but rather have relied on transportation from 
and to the post by means of large lorries. 
\ 
The company further*., requested in 1955 that the government should -give 
them assurances that no other cement industry would be established in East Africa 
for'the.following ten years. This request was over-optimistic on. the-part of the 
company, but it was not effected by the Kenya government not because they were 
unwilling to .agree to such a proposal but rather because the other 'national* 
governments of the territories clearly had no interest in restricting a cement 
industry to Kenya only, \ccordingly, the recUest was put-before the East African 
Industrial Council in 1955' under the Industrial licencing "'Ordinances, but the 
other territories refused to allow cement to become a scheduled industry under 
the Ordinance. Indeed the Tjg mda-development Corporation, in conjunction with 
a British cement firm had reached an agreement in 1952 to. establish their own 
cement processing plant at Tororo, (This plant came into production in 1955). 
120. From the.Director of Trade apd Supplies to British Standard Portland 
Cement (BSPC), l/55 (in KN1 "CI 6/457)." 
121. Prom A. Hope Jones (MCI)' to Dr. P. Mandl (Mmasing director of PSPC), 
2.9.55, (in m op.cit)b a 
122. Prom: BS^C to: A. A. Hope Jones (MCI), 5/55, (in KJJA op.cit). 
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The building of the Pamburi plant began in April 1952 and the works were 
in operation by early 1953« Origionally, two kilns were installed' with"a capacity 
of 80,OOP tons, but in 1955 a third kiln was added to increase output of cement 
to 120,000 tons p.u These developments left Pamburi in 1956 in the position 
of supplying•60^ of Kenya's total cement consumption, (see table B)„ - The plant 
was to increase its initial capacity very rapidlv.after 1953 as the table shows. 
The originnal aim of the company was to tap the r pidly expanding East African 
market for cement as a letter from the British Stand-ord Portland Cement Company 
at Baraburi to the Amalgamated Roadstone Corporation of the TJK in 1951 makes clear, 
'... Export will only arise if production is not absorbed in East Africa and in 
such an unlikely event the obvious markets would be the nearest to hand.' The 
Pamburi plant was by the 1970*3 primarily concerned trith exporting cement, while 
the EAPC .at Athi River supplies the internal market 'from its production. The 
Pamburi plant's expansion into the export market after 1959 was due to a co—incidenc 
of various different factors; there had been a rapid drop in cement consumption in 
East' Africa, (see table£>)at the same time 'as the increased production of the two 
other East African cement plants at fl,thi River ind Tororo in Ugahda. Ulso • 
Pamburi from the 1960*s was ble' to take dvantage of the greatly expanding Middle 
Eastern market for cement, as Kenya was a most convenient Indian Ocean source of 
supply. ' • " 
Pefore the company at Bamburi was' to•commit itself to a major extension 
in 1955j a further list of recuests for concessions was sent to the administration, 
which the BSPC felt to be justified given the 'additional capital to be invested 
•and the risk involved'. ' They repeated the demand for the government to give 
,ua undertaking that competition from other plants -would be restricted, which was 
turned down for the reasons outlined before. They further asked for tax .allowances 
for an initial period of 1 couole of years after the'extension was completed, and 
these were granted -for this period. In 1952. the company had recuested the 
Ministry of Trade and. Supplies in Kenya. Colony to grant them sponsored - shipment 
for the machinery that .'.had.-to be transported from Germany,' .aid this-had been 
•granted. In 1955 the s me concession was /vriarited to the company in-the case of 
123. Prom; BSPC to? the Amalgamated. Roadstone Corporation Ltd '(UK), Dec. 1951, 
(in. KM. op. pit). ........ . . . . _ . 
127,,. From PSPC to MCI 5/55, op.cit-. -
125. a' Ibid . ' "' ' • ' •' • 
126. Prom PSPC to .'v. Hope" Jones ('&!), S.52, (inKH:\ op.cit). In Germany.) 
•{the machinery for the PSpC plant at Pamburi was mainly from-Krupps Ltd. 
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machinery required to be imported for the extension. 
It is clear that the company at B.amburi hoped the government would 
protect their cement in Bast African markets as well as in Kenya, and in the 
same 'package' of reouests they asked the 'anistry of Commerce and Industry to 
guarantee '.that our product "fill find a continuing ready market in Tanganyika..' 
Due to the respective 'nationalist' 'positions of the territorial governments 
this was once again most unlikely to be implementedas the Minister, A. Hope Jones 
was ..to point out in his reply to Dr. M-ndl, we cannot forecast cement 
consumption but I can mike it clear that as far as the government of Kenya 
is concerned, they would naturally be concerned to protect the investments .in 
cement works made in the colony against unf air dumping of cement from abroad 
and that they would always be prepared to consider the position in the light of 
representations made by you and other cement works at present under construction 
12S 
in the colony.' ' ~ The Bamburi Company, therefore, failed to halt the flow of 
Japanese cement into the Tanganyikan market, for it was in the interests of that 
administration to allow the influx of cheap sources of cement as thev did not as A . 1  
yet have a national cement industry to.protect, 
ii Competition; 
By 1955» Bamburi had seen their reruest that no other cement works 
should be established for ten ye?rs, go by the bo-:rd, as plans got underway 
for a cement plant: at Athi River, just south of ..Hair obi, after the discovery 
of limestone deposits at Sultan Hamud. It has been observed before that this 
company had been looking for an opportunity to convert their cement grinding 
plant into a full cement factory. Clearly, the administration was obliged to 
support this well established local industry to the same extent as the.BSPC 
Company at Bamburi. In any event, the protective conditions surrounding cement 
production in Kenya had Oready been established by.1955, .when the CAPC 
decided to construct a second cement plant in Kenya. 
In 1957, therefore, work began, on the cement plant .at Athi River', and. 
the plant went into production in 1958, the construction having cost approximately 
£2,000,000. The capital expenditure therefore on the first 100,000 tons was 
•double that of Bamburi and the factory was using the 'wet' manufacturing process TOO 
which was more expensive in fuel. Also all the fuel for the plant had to be 
carried from the coast, a distance of some 250 riles. At this point there was 
no cross shareholding between the two plants, at athi River and Pamburi as the 
FAPC had the majority of its shares owned by the Associated. Portland Cement 
Company and. the Tunnel Portland, cement company, (the Associated Portland, cement 
127. Prom PSPC to BCI 5/55, op.cit. 
128. From X. Hope Jones to Pr. P. 7! ndl 2.9.55, op. cit. 
TOO. Mbmrt -fVrtm P.fiT t.n ;'Tf!T 10.10.56. 
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company was estimated to be-the' second largest cement producer in 1973 when it 
produced worldwide.a total of 2.7,5m tons of cement,) 
•The demand. for cement was buoyant for a period between 1955 and 195®? 
with a consumption in those years of 479,000 tons for Fast- Africa- aid dropping 
to 412,000 tons respectively. At the end of 1956, the plant at Baraburi announced 
that it would be extending its capacity by the ba coining of 195® to 160,000 tons 
p.a., having taken into consideration competition from the Ugandan ^ororo plant 
and the Athi .liver factory. The Athi liver • F/vPC company was scheduled-to produce 
120,000 tons per annum by .1959 and the. .Toror0 plant was to produce 160,000 tons 
130 
by that year. " Therefore, by 1959? the three Fast African cement plants wers 
capable.of supplying the internal demand for cement from the irea inexcess. 
This position left the three plants.in a serious state of competition from 195® 
onwards, given that all the factories were operating at full capacity and the 
demand for cement was. dropping drastically from the position in 1956,. (see table®). 
Dr. Mandl, the Managing Director of the F^ -pC at '' .sburi explained the conditions 
of overproduction to the 'Ministry of Commerce and Industry,'., until such time 
as the cement industries of Fast Africa receive wholehearted protection by the 
government of the three territories, they cannot do otherwise than reduce 131 -production'. 
The plant at Fomburi, however had always had a competitive advantage over 
over the other two plants at Tororo ind Athi Fiver, and despite complaints by 
the company that the: government should-ban .all imports of cement, it is 
significant that the production level at Famburi was never reduced in absolute 
terms in the 1950's despite the glut, on the market. The advantage to Famburi over 
the other plants clearly lay in their proximity to the port which meant substantial 
savings on transportation of fuel from Mombasa to the plant, and lower production 
costs. A comparison of prices of made cement in 1956 illustrates this point; 
Baobab cement ex. 'forks (^sa) ... 210.10 per ton 
Fock Cement;Tororo ... 13.5 r r 
Blue Triangle cement TTbi ... 13.1® *; ; d^3". 
(-".PC from ground clinker) 
The Athi Fiver plant came, into production in 195®? the price of FAPC triangle 
cement was reduced to .£12,5s. in Nairobi, but thi- still left the coastal factory 
130. . FAS 27.12,57. 
131. FAS 3.12.5®, in 195® the exporting price of Israeli •and Yugoslavian 
cement was below €4 f.o.b. per ton, which meant that .even with the, heavy tariff 
on imported cement, the product was cheaper than that manufactured in East Africa. 
The Ugandan administration in 1959 introduced an anti-dumping bill that totally 
banned the import of cement into ITg'and . 
132. From:.. BSPC To; - The. -Secretary "'for Coirrwrce :anri Industry,. 
~ £1 ~ ibsA? 2"5 
133 with an advantage. " For regarding access to the internal market, the railway 
taper rates rendered the Bamburi product cheaper even given the access to the 
up-country markets, (for mile for mile the rate"became lover, tho'further the distance 
for local products). This situation left the Pamburi plant with -a tactical 
advantage over the other two plants, as it could, if it wished, force the other 
products out of the market. Within Kenya two different international firms, faced 
each other in a state of direct competition, the Bamburi plant being owned 
by Amalgamated Roadstone of UK and Cementia Holdings AC- of Switzerland and the 
BA°C company being controlled by a dominant world producer of cement: The 
Associated. Portland Cement Company and tho Tunnel Portland. Cement Company of 
the U.K. Ultimately the world producer of cement, the .Associated Portland. 
Cement company, according to the laws of concentration was to unite all Kenyan 
sources of production. Put at this point the Bamburi plant, under a different 
ownership, was to dicate the conditions of production. Accordingly in 1956, 
a formal marketing arrangement was concluded, by the three Bast African producers 
giving Bamburi the largest share of the local market with 33?j$ "to Tororo 
and. 29i to SAPC at Athi River.134 Baraburi was in effect, able to dictate the 
terms of the share of the internal market to the other firms, .given its position 
as the largest producer,well situated closer to the Mombasa port. It was, however, 
only a matter of time before the two Kenyan plants were consolidated under the 
ownership of. the firm which although it controlled the smallest Kenyan cement 
plant, was the dominant w o r l d producer, of cement. 
Given the glut on the local market, the Pamburi plant began to orient-
it,self by 1959, primarily towards the export market. In that year, therefore, 
for the first time since the plant came into production, Pamburi exported more 
than it supplied, to the loc i market, providing 130,000 tons to the export market 1 Q r 
with only 95,000 tons going to the local Bast African market.""^ (Consumption ia 
Kenya had dropped from .412,000 tons ia 1956 to 297,000 tons ii 1963, at the 
bottom of the trough.) 
133. Capital expenditure on the Athi River plant was twice that of Bamburi 
for the first -100,000 tons. 
13/;.. Information from interview with the managing director of Pamburi 
Portland cement £7.,':. 76. 
135.' Production figures from interview above, 27.2.76. 
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Therefore the factory it Bamburi between 1959 and 1963, was largely 
concentrating its output on the export market, as production at the plant 
steadily rose.. 
iii) Consolidation % 
It was obvious that cement production in Kenya could be organised more 
rationally if the Athi River and coastal production plants were to be combined, 
at the end of 1963 the Amalgamated Roadstone Corporation of UK sold their 
shareholding in the Bamburi plant to Associated Portland Cement, the British 
conglomerate which was one of the largest cement corporations in the world. The 
o.u_rrying company sold their portion of the B-SPC company at Bamburi because of 
the declining cement sales since 1958? also their main interests were not in 
cement manufacture. The Associated Portland Cement Company now oined of 
Bamburi as well as 4<# in the Bast African Portland Cement company at Athi River, 
thus bringing both sources of Kenyan cement production under the control of a 
prominent world producer of that commodity. In 1964, the British company, the 
Associated Portland Cement, was further able to consolidate its hold over the 
equity of EAPCs,when Tunnell Cement, who also at that time considered the future 
for the cement industry was bleak in that area, sold their remaining 39a in the 
BAPC at Athi Raver to the Banburi Portland cement company, thus giving the 
B.uaburi plant CCA- ownership of the Athi River cement f actory and uniting both 
Kenyan sources of production under the dominant world-wide cement manufacturer. 
There was a move to further tie up Bast African cement production by the 
formation of a subsidiary company of the P/amburi company in Tanzania in 1966, 
which was taken over by the Tanzanian government in 1969. J The Tororo factory, 
formerly owned by the Ugandan Development Corporation, ceased functioning in 1971, 
and since that time the Ugandan market has been supplied entirely by Kenyan 
cement, (legally or illegally). 
The logical division between the coastal company serving the export 
market and the Athi River factory providing the internal, market, took place 
after Independence when 'the ownership of the two pints' h d been unified-;' 
In accordance with the Independent Kenya government's policy of -taking a direct 
•share in major industries of the country in 1971, the BAPC * company at Athi River 
which by now supplied over 80^ of the internal cement reouirements, offered 51< 
of its shareholding for sale to the government. This left the Associated 
136. The information in this paragraph was obtained from the Annual Reports 
of the Registrar General -and the interview op. cit. 
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Portland Cement company -and Cementia with the remaining in "IPC, as well as 
controlling 81$ of Bamburi Portland Cement Company's eouity. Since the cross-
ohareholding was established in 1964, the intern JL and external market have 
been divided up between the two Kenyan plants, whereby in 1974 Bamburi supplied 
approximately 80* of its production to the export market .and Athi River about 
90^ : of its production to the internal market. 
Thus by the mid- 1960's the Associated Portland Cement company managed 
to dominate the conditions of cement production in Kenya :«ic'. Tanganyika* (ifter 
1971 Bamburi was asked by the Ugan<d>n government to man-ge the cement plant at 
Tororo, but they declined, obviously calculating that the Ugandan market would 
be more conveniently served from their Kenyui plants.) 
The pressures of indigenous capitalist on the company did not only 
manifest themselves through the obtaining of eouity shareholding in the firm 
through government corporations* . Before 1971? the manufacturing companies had 
distributed their own cement, thus keeping their profit margins high and 
cutting out the role of middlemen* in the marketing of. the product. However, 
the African trading class put pressure on the government in the early 1970's 
to allow the compulsory distribution of inportant commodities through 
appointed Kenyan agents of the Kenya '•rational Tr-: ding Corporation (KMTC). 
accordingly, in September 1971f -:,n agreement was reached between the government 
aid the comp-my whereby the cement plaits wore to distribute cement trholly 
through the .:1fric.oi owned KHTC appointed .gents, thus allowing the indigenous 
138 bourgeoisie a oh are in the profits of the cement, trade. 
mansion of the Cement ?l:mts t 
The Bamburi coastal cement company had consistently expanded since 
1953 until 1971..when production grew from 35,000 tons to 700,000 tons, 
and these expansions were fin need 1. irgcly from capitalised profits. The 
most recent extension of the Bamburi plant was announced in October 1974, 
which when it id completed, will raise P,-.unburi,s cement production to 1,250,000 ' "! 39 tons per annum. I This extension will cost in total £8.5 million. " Hie 
Commonwealth Development Corporation, once .again in the role of finance capital 
supporting British industrial capital, wis brought in to assist the company 
in this extension with a CI.8 million loan, furthermore, the British government 
137« Ibid,1 this has occured since the 19?0*s. I 1 
13c. mS,3.9o71o 
| : 
139c Bally ?Tation 10.8.75. 
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directly gu r-nteed another loan of £650,000 to be provided by Paring Brothers 
ahcl Company of the United Kingdom. The firm chiefly involved in the construction 
of the new pl ait is the British company Bowlem ltd, and it is significant that 
the British government was to encourage finance capital to support the 
investment of a British firm overseas which would require the input of capital 
goods from Britain at a time when the construction industry as well as the 
capital goods industry was experiencing a recession. Therefore, this British 
based multinational cement firm was to benefit from the interventions of 
international finance capital at a much later stage- in its development. 
This short analysis of tho growth and consolidation of the cement industry 
in post-^ war Kenya has focused on the relationship between the foreign capitals 
concerned, in production and the local colonial -administration. The pressure 
exerted by capital on the state has been evaluated in the light of the 
concessions granted' to the cement industry in tlao colony. Compared with the 
pre-wop period, the administration in the Colony showed n- marked enthusiasm 
•towards providing extensive inff .structure for the foreign company, in order 
to develop the industry.' The only re is on that the commitment by the government 
to providing > r cllway and. bridge connecting the cement factory with the 
porthead was not honoured, was that the administr -tionPs funds were loT_ due to 
the' extra expenditure caused by tho Emergency conditions in Kenya at the time. 
The most important initial condition laid- ''own 'w the company before they 
Would even agree to begin construction of the cement plant in the early 1950*8, 
'was the promise to enact antidumping legislation to protect the plant from 
foreign competition? this wis enacted in 1955. 
One can conclude that the relationship between the post—war colonial 
administration and foreign capital was different from the pre—war period. The 
state Was far more susceptible to pressure from foreign capital to provide certain 
concessions which largo industrial firms considered essential for their 
production, in terms of the provision of infrastructure and services, therefore, 
the local state were prepared to use their funds to actively support secondary 
industries* However, the state was only prepared.' to put in direct support for 
industrial projects when the projects were not initially attractive to private-
enterprise, as in the case of Bast African industries -after the Second World War. 
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H. THE PINEAPPLE INDUSTRY AND KENYA CANNERS, ' 
The setting up of a fruit and vegetable canning factory by both 
local and foreign capital in Kenya Colony after the Second War, was expressedly 
•dollar 
related to the/shortage which was affecting Britain immediately after 1945. 
British fruit manufacturing firms wanted to expand into sterling areas to 
find alternative sources of raw materials for establishing fruit processing 
plants with export potentials, in order to challenge the American 'giants' 
of the fruit canning industry, whose products had a strong hold in both 
British and continental markets. For instance in 1946 of USA fruit canning 
production was sold to the United Kingdom,1^ In the words of the governor 
of Kenya on the opening of the Kenya Canners fruit and vegetable processing dollar 
factory' .. There is a unique opportunity because of the/shortage to capture 
a part of these markets with British Colonial produce; In Canada, for instance, 
there is a large potential demand. Kenya Canners Ltd. has been formed with 
the object of capturing these markets*. 
Therefore., the fruit canning project at Thika was specifically set 
up as an export industry to Europe, Britain and North America. Mr. West of 
Pickering and West, the English fruit preserving firm came to Kenya in 1948 
with the idea of setting up some kind of fruit processing industry. The 
Governor directed him to a local settler farmer, Harries, who had large fruit 
holdings in Thika and who provided a large part of the Nairobi market with 
high quality fresh fruit. Thus Kenya Canners was set up as a partnership 
between the British firm of Pickering and West and Harries, who represented 
the settler small-holder fruit growers. The factory was sited in the heart 
of* the pineapple growing district at Thika on a site adjacent to the newly 
established Metal Box Company, which was convenient for the supply of tin 142 cans to the factory. 
From the cutset of the pineapple canning industry in Kenya, the 
state was to play a most important role in supporting the development of the 
industry, particularly from the point of view of the cultivation of the crop. 
The assistance by the metropolian government by way of developing of agricultural 
productivity amongst African farmers has been considered earlier. The Swynnerton 
Plan of 1954 was designed to provide large scale assistance to African 
small-holder production and pineapples was mads one of the 'designated crops' 
along with tea and pyrethrum. Therefore, the state was concerned to support 
the production side of the pineapple growing enterprise, and it was to provide 
initially loans and technical assistance to smallholders, although it was 
later required to under-write loans for the actual factory. 
140. EAS, 21.4.50. 
141. Ibid. 
142. EAS 10.2.50. 
foreign 
As was norm si in post-war industrial development, ' ••..; the/company, 
Pickering and West did not commit their capital until certain basic conditions 
were agreed tc by the local administration. The state therefore undertook 
to provide all the essential services for the canning factory at Thika, such 
as water, roads and electricity. Furthermore they agreed to implement duties 
against canned imported goods to protect the-local factory, although this 
was not to be so crucial in the case of an industry which was to rely largely 
on the export market. The factory was formally opened in 1950 and.was equipped 
to can other products such as beans and peas as well as pineapples. However, 
the crops availible for canning at this stage were totally inadequate in 
relation to the size of the plant which had been built. For several years 
after 1950, when the factory first commenced production, the cannery was 
dependant mainly on supplies from Harries1 own plantations and some other 
European farmers, 'for the'African smallholder pineapple scheme was as yet 
in its infancy. 
The first expansion planned by the Kenya Canners factory in 1954 
was accompanied by a host of demands to the local administration before any 
further capital was to be expended on the plant. The extensions were,.required 
by the planting programmes implemented under the African.smallholder scheme, 
which it was calculated would raise production from.several thousand tons 
of fruit per annum to 30,000 tons per annum by 1955, This rate of.expansion 
the East African Food Packers Association, (which represented the canning 
industry) felt already imposed processing and marketing problems and that 
the canning industry does not feel justified in embarking upon the 
considerable capital commitments implicit in keeping with even this stage 
of development of pineapple grov/ing under the present conditions. . Over and 
above this the full implication of the Swynnerton Plan must be appreciated 
because it must be realised that without the parallel development of the 
canning industry, further acreage of pineapples may become a liability-' 
rather than an asset', J Thus the Kenya Canners Company, the largest 
fruit'-processing factory in Kenya, dominated the East African Food-Packers 
Association in its negotiations for assistance from the government. There 
were three areas in which the EAFPA felt that the government should directly 
assist the pineapple canning industry: 
a) the high cost of sugar, b) high freight rates, and c) fiece 
comoetition from other Commonwealth countries for markets, FCB Benson, Vi •. • 
the spokesman.fdr the canning industry (employed by Kenya Canners), also 
noted that ',, the Emergency contributes to a lowering in efficiency rsther 
143, From: the Hon, Secretary of the E.A. Food Packers Association, to 
the Secretarv for Crimmp-mc a n r i Tnrinof^ fsr.Tl f-in K W A f J T T A / K O f i l 15 CV1 
i i 
144 than an increase in cost and has to be treated as a temporary factor! 
.""Essentially, the'canning industry in Kenya, ..dominated by .Kenya Canners4 
a partnership between local settler capital and foreign capital, was requesting 
the government to play a more interventionist role in protecting this 'infant 
industry* in.the Colony. The main request put forward in 1954 by the represen-
tatives of the canning firms was that the government should 'under-write' 
the whole operation by guaranteeing an outlet for pineapples grown by African 
smallholders, which would act as an insurance policy to the industry in times 
of low prices on the fruit market. Although pressure was exerted for this 
concession before the prices of pineapples on the world market had plummetted, 
the minimum price guarantees by the government were not implemented until the 
setting up of the Canning Crops Board in 1958. The EAFPA demanded in 1954 
that the government should guarantee: 
a) a minimum price for five years of £15 per ton for graded pineapples 
to the producer (this was the price paid directly to the producer by the 
canner) and; 
b) that the government shall agree to reserve a sum, not exceeding 
£5 per ton for tonnage of.raw pineapple purchased' for canning in any one year 
within a five year period, to be paid to the processor should the industry 
face competition that might compsl. a reduction in prices, 'Given these as-
aBtreaosssi the processing industry will dsrive the degree of confidence necessary 
to put in hand the arrangements!for increased plant, machinery and marketing 
145 
facilities'. The government was finally requested to help increase the 
industry^ competitiveness regarding its position in relation to other national 
canning industries. Among the concessions towards.this and were included: 
a reduction in ocsan freight rates for Kenyan produce, ?, reduction in rail 
freight irates, a reduction in import duty in refined sugar needed for canning, 
and an increase in tariff protection against imported canned fruits. 
• In fact e few of these measures were finally implemented before 
the industry ,was.on the brink of collapse in 1957 with the fall in world 
pineapple .prices. It was at.this time, thrre years after the first request 
for.such protective measures, that the government instituted a Canning Crops 
Board to guarantee minimum prices for producers of fruit, during times of 
depression. However, the government agreed as early as 1955 to put.pressure 
on metropolitan shipping lines to grant reductions in freight rates, and they 
144. , Ibid. 
145. Ibid. 
-1 n r* 
were reduced from Sh. 149/- per ton to Sh. 132/- per ton. 
The Canning industry in Kenya soon faced another production problem 
which was to give rise to new demands for government support. Until 195.5 
all.the three firms that exported pineapples: Kenya Canners, Kenya Orchard 
Ltd. (owned by Marshals Ltd. of LK) and Gibson and Company (foreign owned) 
used local East African sugar, mainly from Miwani Sugar Mills. During 1955, 
the sugar factories in East Africa adopted a habit of adding sulphur to the 
sugar in order to.improve its appearance, which had the effect in the fruit 
canning factories, of corroding the cans and discolouring the pineapples. 
Kenya Cnnners had been pressing the government for some time to.allow the 
canning factories to import sugai; which was of a higher quality,.and more 
suitable for canning purposes than the local product. Therefore, at a time 
when the export market was at its best in 1955, the company was forced.to 
destroy part of its production and give bredits amounting to about £30,000 
in respect of supplies which had already been shipped."^' The problem over 
importing sugar had not been the expense, as it was the same price as the 
local product, Ibut that using imported constituents for the canned products, 
the canning companies, when they exported their products to Britain lost the 
148 
advantages of T.mperial Preference in entering British markets. The local 
administration, therefore, negotiated a deal with the metropolitan state 
that the canning industry should be allowed to import certain quantities 
of refined sugar and still be granted imperial preference to British markets. 
The Kenyan canning industry also pressed.the government to allow 
a rebate on duty that was placed on imported sugar. These companies had 
complained in 1954 about the competition for countries such as South Africa, 
Malaya, Australia and the British West Indies, all of whom, they argued were 
able to buy sugar at world parity prices, which were approximately.£11 per 
ton lower than the Kenyan controlled price. At the end of 1955 the government 
145. In the above memo (fn. 143), The Secretary of the EAFPA submitted 
that the industry should be granted reduced shipping rates to UK markets, 
given their competitive position with regard to other world producers. The 
comparative shipping costs from Kenya and two other production areas was 
advanced: 
Mombasa to LK - S, ' 132/- per measure, 
South Africa to UK S. 75/- per measure, 
Australia to UK S. 132/- per measure. 12.54 
}47, From: the Dept. of Trade and Supplies to: SCI, Nairobi, 21,3.55. 
(KNA op.cit). 
148. Ibid,, 
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iH Kenya allowed the importation of sugar and the rebate of duty thereon. 
From that time onwards the government imported.sugar: on behalf of the canning 149 
industry, giving an allocation tp; .each'factoryat :wholesale .rates. 
i) Competition: By 1957 and 1953, Kenyan canned fruit was experiencing' 
severe competition in international "markets. This occurred at' 'a'time when 
pineapple production from the smallholder plots was mounting towards the 
capacity of the factory. By 1957 the total acreage under pineapple cultivation 
was 7,000 acres with approximately a proportion of 25/c under European small-
150 
holders and 75/o under African cultivation." Employment in the pineapple 
industry had increased from 804 persons in 1956 to'853 In 1957, of which' 
Kenya Canners employed-about 80p. The following comparative figures of pine-
apple exports for 1953 and 1957 indicate the overall decline in sales of 
canned fruit products between 1956 and 1957: 
Table..9 Exports of Canned _fruts_ 1956 »nd 19.57 
. : 1556 . 1957 • 1956 1957 
";c</ RU'intj-ty. " .Value £ 'OOP's 
Pineapples (tons) 6170 5150 757 584 
Pineapple .••.:-.•'-> • '.:• 
•concentrate (galls) 
20,260 " r 29898 5 7 
Passion fruit . 3,820 .;;r 4008- 3 3 
concentrate (galls). 
Vegetables (tons) 454 317 <34 28 
819 622 
r \ 
^Source: Survey of Industrial Production, 1957, j 
For the first time since 1939, the UK market was saturated with tinned fruit 
and pineapples, from both Commonwealth and United.States sources, which was 
a-disaster to the Kenyan industry, for in 1957 'ris£ of the £622,000 earned 
from.pineapple exports, were destined for the UK market. 
In March 1957, Kenya Canners had to close the factory for several 
weeks and refuse to take any more pineapples from the growers, due to this 
contraction in the export market. The Europe-n growers and. the canning 
149. In 1976 It was finally announced that a special sugar factory was 
to be established in Western Kenya to produce fully refined white sugar, 
which will obviate the need that at present still exists to .import sugar • 
for the canning industry, 
150 , From: Dept. of Trade and Supplies to: SCI, 6. 55. (in KNA op.cit). 
151. Ibid. 
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industry as a whole managed tp persuade the government to purchase the crop 
from the growers to avoid their ruin, but a longer term solution had to be 
found to the unstable nature of markets abroad for canned fruit. The company 
in 1957 had an overdraft with Barclays DCO of €125,000 but, '... the overseas 
market position is now such that the company considers it can no longer 
depend on this method of temporary finance in addition to its bank overdraft.. 
it has therefore decided to close down production and preserve its very limited 
152 
remaining resources', The only way in which the company could deal with 
the contraction of its overseas market was to cut its turnover in pineapples, 
I. the financial- position of the company is not fundamentally unsound and 
it is only doing normal business practice in ceasing to buy when it finds 
itself overstocked, .. the conclusion is that if for any reason government 
wishes to increase the turnover of the company-it must supply more working 
• 153 • 
capital'. It was thus in the government's interest to support the ailing 
pineapple industry for it was faced on the one 'side by pressure from the 
European pineapple growers (who owned 40/3 of the factory) and on the other 
there was the prospect of the collapse of a smallholder crop which they had 
sponsored under the Swynnerton Plan. There was some debate as to whether 
the Industrial Development Corporation (IDC) should take a majority share-
holding in the plant, a solution that was pushed strongly by the European 
smallholders. The representatives 'of Kenya Canners had been pressing the 
government since 1955 to establish a statutory board to control the pineapple 
industry, which would include.licencing of canners as well as growers. 
Instead of taking a direct interest in the Kenya Canners plant during 1957, 
the government decided to set up. a Canning Crops Board to regulate the industry, 
and salvage the African smallholder pineapple scheme, with powers to ensure 
'an orderly expansion of the industry and fair .treatment to all growers,. : ..... - . ~ . J. 154 .... . . with powers to licence acreages, fix prices and so on'7 The main concession 
to the canners, was to guarantee minimum prices to the growers during a 
period of depression, and they also agreed to underwrite the industry to the 
tune of £200,000. 
It was clearly of first priority to the local administration to 
protect the interest cf the African smallholder scheme, which they had been 
responsible for instituting. Indeed, the Director of Agriculture in Kenya 
Colony in 1956 had indicated to Kenya Canners that if the company did not 
152. 
153. 
• 154. 
Memo to: MCI, from :' SCI., March 1957, (KNAop.cit.) 
Ibid. 
EAS 10.10.57, report on Debate on Canning Crops Bill in LEGCO. 
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o-expand-to meet.the African smallholder production, then the government1Itself 
155 
would establish.; a cannery to handle African production. it is . also significant 
that the proposal for a partnership between IDC end Kenya"Canners, was initiated 
. by a-group of "27 European pineapple growers indlhika, who wished to buy out 
the shares held by Pickering, and West of'-the-'AJK;'" A memo from ah IDC official 
to the Member for Commerce and.Industry recommended that this suggestion should 
;:''be vetoed, and the latter strongly agreed. The'government were clearly against 
'any form of settler control of the pineapple industry,' ... My reasons for 
. .forming this view are mainly those which you (ivCI}-yourself ' eve developed 
and they can be; summarised in that those'particular growers only represent 
a section of producers and exclude-the African producers who are being encouraged 
by. the government and who are likely to play an increasingly-'important part 
in'the • industry-if it develops along sound lines, I believe BUrsell has an 15S 
••-alternative-, proposition;. • The government had'no; intention of intervening 
to prove funds for.- group which they considered would- curtail the African 
smallholder- scheme, ••! V-
Therefore, the"administration resisted attempts at a European 
takeover of the Kenya Ca'nners plant, although they were dissatisfied with 
the management of the British firm of Pickering and West. In 1953, in fact, 
the Kenya Canners operation was sold off to.another East African based wing 
of British capital in the form of Afcot Ltd., which was a subsidiary of the 
Tanganyika Cotton Company, -its-elf owned by Liverpool family by the name of 
Orme, Afcot took 51/j of the total sharecapital, with the European planters 
still holding the remaining £9/o. 
ii) Consolidation of the Pineapple Industry.: 
A recovery in.the markets for canned fruits began in 1950. The > 
wholesale price of c&pned pineapple.began to increase in Britain after the. 
period of price cutting amongst processors in the late 1950*s, when the prices 
paid. to. growers by Commonwealth .Canners fell from about. £20 per ton to. £5 .. 
per ton. i 
155, To: the Hon, Chief Secretary of the EA Food Packers Association, 
from: SCI. 
155,.. Memo on Assistance tp the Pineapple Canning Industry, from IOC, 
to Ministry for Commerce end Industry (MCl). " 
157. Annual Reports of. the: company for the- Registrar General. 
158,. Report of the Tropical Products Institute Journal, in EAS 11,5,50. 
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In order to take advantage of this recovery of export markets 
the Kenya Canners plant needed capital to expand and ensure a competitive 
position. Neither Afcot, which was essentially•a trading firm with a disparate 
range of .'interests in East Africa, nor the group of settler pineapple growers 
at Thika, had the means to effect such expansions. One of the world's largest 
producers of canned pineapples and other fruit was.the American based firm 
of Delmonte, or the California Packing Corporation." Kenya Canners had been 
one of main competitors of Calpak in European and British markets. It is 
interesting to note however that as early as 1956 when Kenya Canners was 
experiencing production difficulties, the company invited a"Mr. Vongeneel 
to Kenya who was a recently retired President of the Calpak organisation, 
in order that he could offer technical advice to the Kenyan plant. During 
this visit he had given the growers a plan of experiments and cannery targets 
for the -factory. Apart.from this connection, Kenya Canners and Calpak had 
been fierce competitors, in British markets particularly. In 1955, after 
one years negotiation, the Calpak corporation was given the managing agency 
of Kenya Canners, In the words of the Tancot annual report (the controlling 
shareholder of Kenya Canners), '... It is not our wish to sever our connection 
entirely, but the fact is that Calpak have the know-how, the marketing facilities 
and the financial resources.to develop this industry properly', all of which 
15q 
we lacked'. w Thus Calpak, one of the worlds' largest producers of canned 
fruit in Kenya, at the same time diversifying their areas of cultivation wich 
up until 1965 had been located mainly in.the Phillipines and Hawaii. 
At the same time they had gained control, of a-competitor which had been challeng-
ing its hold over European and British markets. This -control was formally 
consolidated in 1956 when Calpak took 9C£o of the Kenya Canner's share capital, 
leaving only lOjo in the hands of the origional European farmer: Air Harries 161 * and Company. " (By this time the European smallholders had been compelled 
to sell their land to the post-Independence settlement schemes,) 
159, Tancot Company Newsletter,. July 1965, 
160, • Calpak's desire to move from Hawaii'during the mid and late 1960's 
was prompted among other reasons, by the power of the labour unions in that 
country which were'insisting on higher pay and better conditions for workers 
on the plantations, 
161, This local white-owned company has since the Calpak takeover been 
involved in the cultivation of Macadamia nuts for export. 
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iii) Monopoly Conditions created: 
The first agreement between Calpak and the Kenya Canning Company 
of 1965 involved the injection of £5m by the American company into the plant, 
in order to expand its productive capacity , arid extend the acreage under 
pineapple cultivation. This project involved o considerable increase in 
Kenya's exports of canned fruits and vegetables, which was to be facilitated 
by COC's world wide marketing network and its degree of technical and scientific 
concentration. The main aim of the Calpak expansion programme was to 
rationalise the Kenya.Canners system of production of pineapples and the 
processing techniciues, so as to improve the quality of pineapples in conformity 
with their international standards. The first phase of the expansion programme 
was designed tc raise the intake of pineapples from 20,000 tons p,a. 35,000 
tons p.a., a target to be reached by 1963. "" At the same time Calpak carried 
out an experimental programme to increase production at'a much higher level 
than before. This was the first indication that the smallholder production 
scheme by which the Kenya Cannr1s factory had been supplied with pineapples, 
was likely to be phased out in favour of Calpak8s more capital intensive form 
of estate production, which the corporation employed in its other growing 
areas of the world. This move to rationalise production in Kenya Canners also 
involved a pruning of the labour force at the factory as part of the move 
towards concentrating production. During the first phase (1965-1969) production 
was to be increased from 20,000 to 35,000 tons of pineapples per annum, and 
by 1970 the factory was scheduled to produce over ?.70,000 tons of pineapples 
p.a. This increase in production could be achieved with a smaller labour 
force than before, a situation that was rationalised by the company in the 
following terms in 1967: '.. No employees were actually sacked but a large 
1G3 
number had resignnd after being offered an attractive settlement', " The 
Crilpak planting programme on the estates was closely supervised by the parent 
company's technical staff and the "resultant increase in production was 
scheduled for 1968. 
The sector of international capital which now effectively controlled 
the conditions of pineapple production in Kenya now also expected a high degree 
, of government assistance, for the industry in the same way- as the Pickering 
- and West partnership had done :in the early 1950's. By mid 1967, the Calpak 
controlled Kenya Ganners complained to the government th~t the company wis 
operating at e loss because of 'insufficient quantities of pineapples to work 
the cannery-.at an economic level'. This obviously refered to the rate of 
162. , PAS, 4.6.65^ 
153. \ EAS, 8,2.66, 
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return which the Calpak company expected on their investment; indeed, the 
balance sheets for the company showed a net loss for the whole period of 
' 165 
Kenya Canner's operationsf In any event, Calpak placed the onus for the 
failure to extend planting between 1966 and 1968 on the government. Although 
the essence of the problem was that however fast the government were to imple-
ment extensions in smallholder pineapple growing growing amongst African farmers, 
the method most suited to high turnover in the factory, in Calpak''s estimation, 
was the estate form. 
From their first-entry into Kenya in .1965, Calpak had. expected the 
state to finance the growing side of- the operation, and take responsibility 
for its success or failure. Therefore in 1967, it was no surprise when the 
company requested the government to underwrite a loan to Kenya Canners of 
£250,000 from Barclays Bank, the loan guarantee to be given by the government 
Canning Crops-Board. Approval for this loan was passed through Parliament 
in-June 1967, the Minister for Agriculture said that the main purpose~of 
the loan was 'to arrest the decline of a.very important enterprise which was 
processing many pineapples, most of which were grown by Africans, and help 
-the company face the difficult-conditions caused by-increased competition 
and lack of planting materials that gave high yields'."^5' Kenya Canners 
were apparently at this time doing so badly in terms- of sales that they. , had 
to mortgage part of their assets to meet annual losses.-
The Minister for Agriculture furthermore assured Parliament that 
there was no danger of the government being held responsible for the loan, 
for even if Kenya Canners failed to repay, it would be covered by.a cess levied 
by the Canning Crops Board on pineapples delivered to the factor:/. Some petty-
bourgeois politicians soon launched into an attack on the government for 
suoporting foreign enterprises in this way, Mr. Okelo-Odongo (KPU Kisumu j . . . Rural) said, '.. it is wrong for the government to guarantee loans for private 
-companies owned by foreigners. If the company had failed it should go into 
liquidation, and if possible the government should encourage the growers to 
form a cooperative, and take over the factory'. This was a popular view 
amongst this class. 
165.- - . This is -probably due not 'real' losses, but -rather accounting 
techniques, used by foreign corporations to enable them to transfer -out of 
the country surplus from their production. 
166. EAS, 14.6.67. " 
157a. Ibid. . . . 
167.'' Ibid. 
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. In November, 1967, the company managed to secure government -' ~ * 
co-operation to divert, all large pineapples (suitable for canning) from the 
domestic market to the Thika factory, until the areas planted under the estate 
form as part of the extension programme, reached maturity. The pineapple 
.. Development Authority, accordingly imposed a levy of,:S. 2/75 per ton on all 
consignments of fresh pineapples destined for the local, m a r k e t . 1 9 6 8 
Delmonte found it impossible to meet its production target of. 35,000 tons 
throughput of pineapples per annum, as had been specified in the 1965 plan 
for development of capacity of KCL. Due to this failure to mould smallholder 
production according to the targets planned by the international capital, 
a decision was made by the company that all the smallholder land should 
be converted into estates. Accordingly, the government agreed to purchase 
the land from the smallholders (both African and European) and sell it~in 
169 .,,.,... .... 
stages to the company. In the same way as the colonial government had 
agreed to place the industry in cuooon after the disastrous fall in prices 
of pineapples on the world market in 1957, by guaranteeing the industry minimum 
prices, so' the independent government agreed to restrict licences for pineapple 
canning.and growing and to guarantee not to sponsor further pineapple growing 
schemes. With these final concessions, the company was able to convert the 
system of pineapple production for export entirely to the estate form which 
they found suited international standards of production. Thus the smallholder 
scheme which had been initiated by state finance capital under the Swynnetrfeon 
.plan- gave way to more capital-intensive forms of estate production under 
the direction of the dominant world producer of canned pineapples. 
By 1972, the share of smallholder pineapples as a % of the factory's total 
throughput had dropped to around 25$, and by .1972 not even this amount was 
being filled by smallholder, production. As we have indicated, Calpak always 
had the intention of constructing a capital intensive estate -form of production. 
This had been clear since the first management contract between Caloak and 
the Kenya Canners, where the former insisted that the government should 
allow them to immediately convert the old' Anglo-American sisal estate, at 
Thika into an intensively farmed pineapple plantation in. return for their 
infusion of capital into the pineapple industry. This estate served as 
a nucleus in the area for the development and further expansion of Calpak's 
intensively farmed pineapple plantation,,. After 1968, all the smallholder 
land was to be absorbed into this scheme, ' -
168. 
169. 
EAS, 30.11.67. 
EAS, 22,7,72 
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The irony of the situation lay in the fact that the company had 
obviously played -long with the Government's original* aim of continuing to 
encourage pineapple cultivation by African smallholders. After 1S5G all the 
smallholder land was bought first by the government nnd then leased to Delmonte 
in stages. The government therefore agreed after that time to the foreign 
company converting the pineapple scheme entirely over from smallholder to 
estate production, despite the massive government loans after 1963 granted 
to the smallholder growers. By 1972, therefore, the fruit grown by the 
remaining African smallholders had no market and neither Kenya Canners nor 
Kenya Orchards Ltd. would purchase their products. Indeed, in 1972 the 
government was to come under attack for having encouraged the smallholder 
scheme in the Muranga and Kiambuto areas to the extent of having dispensed 
170 
some £70,000 in loans to small growers, when there was to be no market 
for their products in years to come. The M.P. for Juja, Mr. G. Kahengeri, 
who represented the small pineapple growers of the area voiced strong objections 
to.the way they had been treated by the company and the government itself; 
'... the government.told the farmers that their pineapples would be bought 
by Kenya Canner Ltd, and the K.O.L., but subsequently the government bought 
some 25,000 acres of land and leased it to Kenya Canners to grow pineapples 3 71 
so that the small producers had nowhere to sell their products'. Further 
accusations followed, from the same M.P., who claimed that the company was 
bulldozing farmers' crops around their plantation, and incorporating land 
on the borders of their estates on which company labour had previously lived. .backed 
During the 1960* s state loans, had / up both estate and .small-
holder forms of production in the pineapple-canning industry, thus encouraging 
these 'dual' forms of production within the same industry. International 
capital, however-,is-always capable of shaping production in the way most 
suitable to its worldwide methods, • A •similar duality in the in;the methods of 
production existed in Kenya since the 1950*s in the case of tea, but a 
different pattern was.to emerge from that in the pineapple industry. The 
dominant foreign capital in the tea industry: Brooke Bond, found that through 
the smallholder system operating alongside the tea estates they could enforce 
high standards of plucking and manufacture which, would produce a high, quality 
product to complement their own estate production, The co-existence.of 
smallholder and estate forms of production in the case of pineapples, however, 
was not calculated by the foreign capital, Delmonte, to be at all viable given 
170, EAS, 22,7,72, 
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t'ne highly competitive nature of the canning industry worldwide. There-
fore the smallholder system which did not comply with the global requirements 
of standards and quality, was eliminated by the foreign corporation with the 
assistance of the state, and since 1968 the state form of production has 
been dominant in the canning industry. 
smallgrowers pineapple scheme in the mid 1950*s, by the 1970*s was permitting 
international capital to bring all forms of production under estate control. 
This analysis of the development of the pineapple industry shows the stages 
through which the industry has passed since its inception in 1950, The 
predominant trend is -a', high level of support by the state, through the 
provision of finance capital to the growing scheme under the Swynnerton 
Plan and also by the provision of direct support to the Kenya Canners company 
itself. The relationship between the state and private foreign enterprise 
has been outlined during the 1950's. The most important concession to be 
gained by the latter was in 1958, when after 4 years of pressure to set up 
some form of statutory control over the industry, the government finally agreed 
to form a Canning Crops Board, which would in effect, guarantee minimum 
prices to the pineapple growers, and thus take the onus of their failure 
from the company in times of depressed prices. During the 1960's a larger 
and dominant international firm of fruit processors, Delmonte* was able to 
take over the management end the equity control of the Kenya Canners plant 
at Thika, and fashion production according to its international mode of 
production: which took the form of estate cultivation. The smallholder 
pineapple scheme which had been set up by the colonial government in the 
1950's was demolished and absorbed into a form, of production that best 
suited the needs of this international capital. 
TABLE 9 Balance Sheet Summaries of Kenya Canners Ltd. 
Issued Capital Net Assets Net Profit (post tax) 
Thus, the Kenya government, although officially supporting the 
1960 127,333 153,321 
1965 128,133 111.729 
1970 366,452 116,564 
1972 366,452 (709,468) 
(50,288) Loss 
(59.544) 
(54,179) 
(67,475) 
(Source: Registrar General of Companies.) 
172. 
coastal 
This gave rise to the development of an export capacity by the 
.—based company. 
- 79 -
IDS/WP 275 
Summary and Conclusion: 
In this paper we have concentrated on the role played by the 
post-war colonial state in promo tin? in&ustaiaLisotien -in-Sca^a. T&fas 
analysis has been set in the generf.l pattern of British policy towards 
the colonies in response to posi-'-var conditions and the reasons for 
a radical shift in the emphasis of this policy towards 'development' in 
the colonial territories have beer, outlined. It has been stressed that 
'capital1 and the 'state' although "heir movement is not synonomous, do 
operate on the same level in certain circumstances. Forinstance, the 
measures to encourage industrial leveloprnent and increased production of 
primary commodities after the war, served both the 'state' as a totality 
and also the needs of British industrial capital. The most serious 
problem faced by the post-war metropolitan state was the severe dollar 
deficit to the United States. This caused the state to stimulate pro-
duction in the colonial areas for several reasons: to avoid purchases in 
dollar areas and enhance the flo'.v of raw materials to British industry. 
/ 
This applied not only to raisinf agricultural productivity,, but also the 
development of secondary industry was encouraged. This was in marked 
contrast to the attitude of the colonial administation before the wa 
when industrial development in the colonies had been positively discouraged. 
1 
I If there was a prospect of a colonial industry in the inter-war 
years developing an; export capacity to the metropolitan market, and 
therefore threatening the markets of British industrial capital, then 
j 
the he^p of the Colonial Office was enlisted to squash that industry, f 
(the two cases that come to mind in relation to East Africa are the textile 
industry in Kenya and the sisal twine industry in Tanganyika). In some 
cases small industries did emerge before the war mainly to supply the 
local market (apart from the grain and dairy industries which were 
controlled by the settlers and directed towards the export market). Indeed 
their existence in Kenya as apposed to Tanganyika territory reflected the 
• • . f • 
/strength of the settler estate producers within the colonial state* when 
itcame to bargaining with the metropolitan administration. However, it is 
/ not unrealistic to assert that the establishment of secondary industry 
• /: in the colonies tended to be held back before the Second War due to the 
1 opposition of British1manufacturers. However, even by the 1930's British 
dominance of colonial import markets for manufactured goods was becoming 
^Increasingly insecure, and the natural move of British Industrial capitals 
r^a.s to go directly into production in the colonial areas behind the tariff 
wal 1 « 
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Another difference in the pattern of post war colonial policy-
was the enhanced- role of finance capital in capitalist expansion worldwide 
Finance capital after 1945'had? on a global scale, gone beyond its 
traditional, function as a mere 'book-keeper' for productive capital,State 
finance capital in the context of post-war Britain, was aimed towards 
intervening in areas not initially favourable to industrial capital. 
intimately the projects w.ereIBi-ced off by finance capital to industrial 
capital after they had actually been set up by the agency of the former-
To illustrate this mechanism .the GDC is put forward as a focus for the 
/ 
analysis, with particular reference to its role in the 'fostering' of 
the East African industries plant, which was in 1955 hived off to a British 
industrial capital of Unilever Ltd. 
Nextj the policy of the state towards industrialisation in Kenya 
is evaluated in the context of the highly concentrated structure of indu-
stries which emerged after the 1950's. The industrial licencing legisla-
tion introduced by the colonial government in the early 1950's was to 
encourage the dominance of a few firms within each industrial sector, the 
idea being to force out 'uneconomic' producers. In some branches of 
industry there was more competition than in others. In the case of paint 
manufacture there were four foreign firms involved in production with one 
local firm producing lower grade, heavy duty paint. However,.the more 
usual pattern of development was for -one or two international or local 
firms to dominate a particular branch of production, a trend which was 
encouraged by the licencing legislation in several cases such as that of 
shoes and textiles. Protection granted to industry through tariff protec-
tion was not to become an integral part of government policy in Kenya 
Colony until after 195-3, and before that time a more and hoc system of 
tariff protection was administered in response to pressure from individual 
•firms. The email number of firms in each industrial group also reflected 
to some extent the limitations of the irrasfc. M^ean'-aericet' 
goods, for in some cases, such as cement, where only a few firms existed 
in the area as a whole, the plants by the late 1950's were operating well 
below their maximum capacity. Before a sales quota was agreed to by the 
3 firms in East Africa, each plant was in a state of serious competition 
with the others. 
The section on industrial growth in Kenya also examines the 
unfulfilled poten-Hal of Asian capitalists in becoming a m.tijap.al. be-p££6f*>iise 
^Lass. The compression of this class between the forces of settler and 
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indigenous capitalism before 1945 largely determined their pattern of 
accumulation in subsequent years. In any consideration of the development 
of indigenous capitalism at the present tiro this movement of a local 
capital into industry from the 1950's is most important. 
The two case studies are intended to magnify the relationship 
between the colonial administration in Kenya and industrial capital, one 
is on the cement industry the other on pineapples. The cement study is 
designed to illustrate the degree of support required by industrial capital 
from the state before productive investments were made in Kenya. The way 
in which government policy encouraged the rr.3Tgea:-c.e .•ofra'/Joighiy co.Trcfceo.'fcca.ted 
structure in the industry is also examined. The concessions granted to the 
Bamburi company from the early 1950's were not part of a coherent policy 
of protection for new industries, but rather were in direct response to 
pressure from the company. The analysis of the conditions of production 
in the cement industry is extended into the 1960's. to show the emergence 
of one foreign capital in a dominant position in Bast Africa. 
The case of Kenya Canners and the pineapple industry shows more 
directly the determining role played by the state in the promotion of 
African agriculture, as part; of a drive to decrease the dependence of 
Britain on foods from the dollar areas. The local colonial state and later 
the independent Kenya government were to play a central part in supporting t 
the growing side of this industry. These interventions by the state were <• • 
encouraged by industrial capital in order to boulster up a primary products 
industry that was most susceptible to fluctuations on the international 
market. Thus, minimum prices were guaranteed to smallholder pineapple 
growers from 1957 onwards, after the formation of the Canning Crops B<£ard. 
In effect the government *.had agreed to underwrite the industry in the 
event of punitive, competition on international markets. This- policy was-
continued under tne independent Kenya government and the state was to play 
an even more extensive role in assisting dominant world pineapple producer? 
Delmonte, in its conversion of the smallholder scheme to the estate form 
of production in 1968. Therefore,.after this time, the state having expended 
several million pounds on developing a growing scheme for the processing 
of pineapples, assisted dominant foreign capital in "-dismantling the small-
holder scheme which did not suit the global production patterns of the 
international, capital. 
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After this analysis a pattern emerges not of a state bent on 
intervention, but rather a local administration which had the resources 
available to 'cushion1 industrial capital usually in response to pressure 
from the latter. This state support for private investment in primary 
production and industry was largely instigated from the metropolis, which 
in the post-war situation required an increased level of production from 
the colonial territories. The state as a'totality' was concerned to 
stimulate capital goods production in Britain which had suffered a decline 
due to wartime conditions. Furthermore, the move of British industrial 
capitals into production behind tariff walls in the colonies had become 
a logical response to competitive conditions in these.markets even before 
the war. These requirements of the state and the movement of industrial 
capital after the war combined to advance the process of import-substitu-
ting industrialisation in colonial territories such as Kenya. 
Abbreviati»ns; 
K M - Kenya national Archives 
EAI - East African Industries 
M S - East African Standard (newspaper) 
SCI - Secretary for Commerce and Industry 
MCI - 1-ember for Camaierce and Industry 
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